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According to this popular legend, in 1937 the United States Supreme Court abruptly reversed course from the close scrutiny
characteristic of its traditional police powers jurisprudence and
adopted a more deferential standard of constitutional review in legal disputes arising from public control of private economic affairs.
Central to this story is the assumption that the Court altered its
constitutional jurisprudence in the wake of a plan to pack the
Court with younger Justices presumably more sympathetic to the
social and economic reforms of the New Deal.2 Announced in February of that year by an exasperated President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, who despite strong political support had fared poorly
before the Court in cases involving constitutional challenges to the
initial phase of his New Deal program,3 the Court-packing plan unThis phrase appears in a May 19, 1937, letter from Edward Corwin to Attorney
General Homer Cummings. G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal
319 n.4 (2000); see also id. at 17 (discussing Corwin's coining of the phrase). An
influential constitutional historian during the first half of the twentieth century and
frequent critic of the Supreme Court, Corwin, a professor of political science at
Princeton University, in 1936 consulted with Cummings about the appointment of
additional, younger Justices to the Supreme Court in the event the Court's
septegenerian members refused to resign. For discussion of Corwin's role in the
infamous Court-packing plan, see id. at 318 n.3; see also William E. Leuchtenburg,
The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt
115-19 (1995) (discussing the development of the Court-packing plan). The phrase
also appears in Joseph Alsop & Turner Catledge, The 168 Days 135 (1938); see also
Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, Or Felix the Cat, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 620, 623 n.11
(1994) (discussing the provenance of the phrase "switch in time that saved nine").
2 See, e.g., Alsop & Catledge, supra note 1, at 141; Edward S. Corwin, Court Over
Constitution 127 (1938); Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American
Constitutional Law 200, 203, 221-22. In particular, Wright perceived the result in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), in which the Court appeared to
reverse course from precedent invalidating minimum wage legislation for women, as
"the opening move in the Court's strategic retreat produced by the Roosevelt Court
bill." Wright, supra, at 222.
3E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (finding that federal regulation
of labor relations within the coal industry violated the Commerce Clause); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating a processing tax enacted pursuant to
the Agricultural Adjustment Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that the Commerce Clause prohibited the application of
the National Industrial Recovery Act's hour and wage requirements to a local poultry
business); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (ruling the "hot oil" provision of
the National Industrial Recovery Act violated the non-delegation doctrine).

2002]

Understandingthe New Deal Court

267

derscored the inherent tension in American constitutional democracy between the political branches and an unelected federal
judiciary.! The Supreme Court, so history tells us, eventually succumbed to the external pressures of political and social sentiment
and yielded in its constitutional opposition to New Deal economic
legislation
Over the course of ensuing decades some scholars have subscribed to this notion of constitutional history.' Accordingly, they
have regarded the Court's pivotal decisions of 1937 involving
minimum wage legislation,7 the Commerce Clause,8 and social se-

4 Pursuant to the plan, the President would appoint, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, an additional Justice to the Supreme Court in the event a Justice declined
to retire from the Court within six months upon attaining the age of seventy. The
plan, which capped the number of Supreme Court Justices at fifteen, presumably
would have permitted the President to put onto the Court younger Justices more
sympathetic to his economic reform policies than the elderly Justices who comprised
the Court. In 1937, six of the Justices were over seventy years of age. Ultimately, the
plan died in Congress. For background of the Court-packing plan, see Leuchtenburg,
supra note 1, at 82-162.
1See, e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Burger 108286(3d ed. 1979); Wright, supra note 2, at 200-17,222.
See, e.g., Mason, supra note 5, at 97-128; Robert G. McCloskey, The American
Supreme Court 117-20 (3d ed. 2000); Wright, supra note 2, at 221-22; see also
William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR'S Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second
Death, 1985 Duke L.J. 673, 673 (noting the widespread acceptance of this notion in
works on American history). But see generally Richard Friedman, Switching Time
and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional
Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891 (1994) (refuting the influence of external
political pressure on the Hughes Court).
7W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 379 (upholding a Washington minimum wage law
for women). West Coast Hotel Co. overruled Adkins v. Children'sHospital, 261 U.S.
525 (1923) and distinguished, on other grounds, Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936) (both invalidating minimum wage laws for women).
8See Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937) (upholding
application of the NLRA to an interstate transportation company); Associated Press
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (sustaining the application of the NLRA to the
editorial department of a private news agency); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (upholding application of the NLRA to the clothing
manufacturing industry); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937)
(upholding application of the NLRA to the trailer manufacturing industry); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (sustaining the application of the
NLRA to the production of steel). These cases limited the application of Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. at 238 (invoking the traditional distinction between manufacturing and
commerce and finding that labor relations had an indirect and remote effect upon
interstate commerce).
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curity9 as part of an elaborate attempt by the justices to avoid the
institutional upheaval threatened by the Court-packing plan. In its
retreat, the Supreme Court apparently not only spared itself from
political reconfiguration but also changed the course of twentiethcentury constitutional law. Having shed the shackles of laissez-faire
economics and Social Darwinism,"0 through which purportedly several of the Justices had construed the concepts of due process and
personal liberty, the Court emerged in the decades immediately
thereafter as the ultimate guardian of civil rights in American constitutional democracy. 1 Bifurcated judicial review marked by the
primacy of fundamental, mostly enumerated, constitutional rights
supplanted a more rigid and idiosyncratic jurisprudence in which
the Justices ostensibly had, throughout the late nineteenth and into
the early twentieth centuries, interpreted the Constitution through
a preconceived set of socioeconomic convictions intended to pre2
serve the status quo and the security of property rights. Viewed

9See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937) (both sustaining the Social Security Act of 1935). But see R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating retirement pension for railroad
workers provided by the Railroad Retirement Act).
10See generally Ronald F. Howell, The Judicial Conservatives Three Decades Ago:
Aristocratic Guardians of the Prerogatives of Property and the Judiciary, 49 Va. L.
Rev. 1447 (1963) (linking the police powers jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
during the 1920s and 1930s to laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism); Frank
R. Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and
Emasculation, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 419 (1973) (same). But see generally Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 379
(1988) (describing the pervasive influence of classical economic theory while refuting
the influence of Social Darwinism during the Lochner era); Samuel R. Olken, Justice
George Sutherland and Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism and the
Problem of Factions, 6 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1 (1997) (demonstrating that neither
laissez-faire economics nor Social Darwinism significantly influenced judicial
behavior during the latter half of the nineteenth and first third of the twentieth
centuries).
" See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second
Century, 1888-1986, at 271-73 (1990).
12See generally Howell, supra note 10 (suggesting Lochner-era jurists employed
judicial review to protect an economic elite and preserve the status quo in the wake of
industrial reform legislation); Strong, supra note 10 (same). The term bifurcated
review refers to the different standards of judicial review employed in economic
regulation (minimal review), and noneconomic regulation cases (heightened review).
Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding an economic
regulation under the rational basis standard of review), with Schneider v. New Jersey,
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from this conventional perspective, the jurisprudential transformation that occurred was a peaceful one marked by the triumph of
law over the whims of an unelected judiciary deemed unresponsive
to the tides of democracy. This, in summary, is both the lesson and
the central meaning of the constitutional revolution of 1937."3
Yet, despite its apparent resonance, this story contains significant historical errors that oversimplify the course of early
twentieth-century constitutional jurisprudence. Ultimately, the dissonance between fact and fiction reveals the political and
sociological biases of both progenitors and subsequent guardians of
the conventional narrative. For in advancing the myth of a singular
constitutional revolution of 1937, spawned in large part by an ineluctable collision between the elected and judicial branches of the
national government, those who have steadfastly perpetuated the
mainstream account of early twentieth-century constitutional development have unfortunately created a version of history marked
by the distortion of precedent and a chronic misunderstanding of
early twentieth-century judicial behavior. Moreover, several of the
conventional tenets do not necessarily withstand close examination. Foremost among these is the notion that the Supreme Court
justices who dissented from the Court's pivotal Contract Clause,
Commerce Clause, and Due Process decisions of the mid- to late1930s were judicial reactionaries intent upon preserving the property rights of an economic elite. 4
308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating, under heightened scrutiny, an ordinance that
prohibited the distribution of leaflets on public streets).
3This phrase refers to the period between 1935 and 1937 when the Court appeared
to suddenly reverse course in its constitutional assessment of New Deal Programs. See
Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 39-79 (1942) (discussing the
Supreme Court and the New Deal).
14Associate Justices Pierce Butler, James Clark McReynolds, George Sutherland,

and Willis Van Devanter all dissented from the Court's transformative opinions in

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (finding a close and substantial
relationship existed between labor relations within a steel plant and the flow of
interstate commerce); West CoastHotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding

a Washington minimum wage law for women as a reasonable exercise of state police

powers); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (sustaining a New York regulation
of milk prices as a reasonable economic measure and collapsing the distinction
between public and private economic interests); and Home Building and Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a Minnesota mortgage
moratorium as a reasonable exercise of local police powers that did not impair the
constitutional obligation of contracts). Conventional narratives of constitutional
history refer to these dissenting Justices in pejorative terns as either "The Four
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As the twentieth century drew to a close, some historians began
to reassess various components of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence between the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Consequently, cracks emerged in the edifice of
conventional constitutional history. Charles McCurdy, for example,
re-examined the notion of liberty of contract and concluded that
Lochner-era jurists invoked this doctrine to protect private economic interests as rights of both individual liberty and property
from the tyranny of transient democratic majorities.' Professor
McCurdy also questioned the traditional view that judges of this
period imbued constitutional interpretation with preconceived
economic biases.16 Similarly, Professor Michael Les Benedict explained that the laissez-faire constitutionalism characteristic of late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century judicial review actually derived from Jacksonian democratic ideals about equal operation of
the law and concerns about class legislation and not necessarily
from neo-classical economic theory or Social Darwinism.17
More recently, Professor Howard Gillman expanded upon these
revisionist theories in a seminal book about the trajectory of
Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence. 8 Gillman identified factional aversion as the linchpin of judicial review of economic
regulation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Jurists, therefore, distinguished between partial laws, enacted for
the benefit of some classes at the expense of others, and neutral

Horsemen" or "The Four Horsemen of Reaction." See, e.g., Fred Rodell, Nine Men:

A Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790-1955, at 217 (1955). For wry
criticism of this approach, see generally Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four
Horsemen, 83 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1997).
15See generally Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of
Laissez-Faire
of
Parameters
Some
Relations:
Government-Business

Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. Am. Hist. 970-1005 (1975) (discussing late
nineteenth-century police powers jurisprudence).
16See Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered:
Major Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Y.B. Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc'y
20,20,26-33.
17See generally Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation
of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law & Hist. Rev.

293 (1985) (distinguishing between laissez-faire
constitutionalism).

economics and laissez-faire

Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner
18
Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (1993).
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laws that advanced the public welfare. 9 Thus, only illegitimate class
legislation that bore a tenuous relationship to the public welfare infringed upon liberty of contract and violated due process.' From
this perspective, heightened judicial scrutiny of minimum wage
laws and other forms of redistributive legislation reflected longstanding aversion to political factions and not necessarily the
anachronistic socioeconomic theories often ascribed to the Justices
on the losing side in the purported constitutional revolution of
1937.
Other historians have focused upon the structural changes in
constitutional interpretation that occurred during the first few decades of the last century. Most notable of these is Professor Barry
Cushman, whose doctrinal synthesis of Due Process and Commerce Clause cases of this era offered a compelling alternative to
the conventional account.2 Cushman argued that once the Court
began to collapse the analytical distinction between public and private economic interests, its traditional jurisprudential tenets
concerning legal issues of political economy eventually yielded to a
more instrumental conception of judicial review increasingly deferential to economic reform and redistributive legislation. Cushman
viewed this doctrinal evolution, rather than the external pressure
of New Deal politics, as the fulcrum for transformation of the Su-

19
See, e.g., People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870) (ruling a state could not pass

preferential tax legislation for a railroad). See generally Alan Jones, Thomas M.

Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. Am. Hist.
751 (1967) (offering a revisionist historical analysis attributing Cooley's anti-

factionalism to Jacksonian democracy).
See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a minimum
wage law for women); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating
maximum hours legislation applied to bakers); see also Olken, supra note 10, at 21-35
(discussing the emergence of substantive due process as a limitation on police power

regulations benefiting one group over another). See generally Gillman, supra note 18
(explaining that factional aversion and not laissez-faire economic theory influenced
judicial review of local police powers). But see Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678
(1888) (upholding a law prohibiting the sale and manufacture of oleomargarine as a

legitimate exercise of state police powers).

21Barry
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a
Constitutional Revolution (1998) (discussing the doctrinal transformation in the
Court's jurisprudence of political economy).
2 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (significantly expanding the
common law category of "businesses affected with a public interest" while upholding
public regulation of milk sold within New York by seemingly private retailers).
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preme Court's constitutional jurisprudence between the 1920s and
1940s. In particular, Cushman suggested that the course of change
in constitutional interpretation was much more gradual and layered than represented by conventional accounts of this period.'
Now into the fray comes Professor G. Edward White, one of the
nation's preeminent legal historians and the author of several important books about the intersection of law and history. 4 Perhaps
none of his books is more important, however, than his most recent
work, The Constitutionand the New Deal, an elegant and masterful
study of the transformation of the constitutional jurisprudence of
the United States Supreme Court during the first half of the twentieth century.' Primarily adapted from several law review articles
the author published in leading law reviews throughout the past
decade, this book re-examines the strands of early twentiethcentury constitutional jurisprudence. Not only does it reinforce
Cushman's conclusions about the pace of jurisprudential change, it
also approaches the issue of reconciling the New Deal and the Supreme Court as a problem of historiography. White offers a revised
historical account of early twentieth-century constitutional thought
that analyzes the broad contours of change in historical context.
Rather than focus on doctrinal intricacies, the book makes selective use of academic commentary from the subject period and
representative Supreme Court decisions to illustrate the arc of constitutional development in several areas, including a few often
neglected by scholars of this era.
In essence a study of intellectual constitutional history, it also
provides extensive criticism of traditional historiography and posits
that much of the contemporary misunderstanding about the role of
the Supreme Court during the New Deal emanates from flawed
2Cushman,
24

supra note 21, at 33-43.

G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition (1976); G. Edward White,

Earl Warren: A Public Life (1982); G. Edward White, Intervention and Detachment:
Essays in Legal History and Jurisprudence (1994) [hereinafter White, Intervention
and Detachment]; G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and The
Inner Self (1993) [hereinafter White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes]; G. Edward
White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change (1988) [hereinafter White, The
Marshall Court]; G. Edward White, Patterns of American Legal Thought (1978); G.

Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History (1980) [hereinafter
White, Tort Law in America].
2

White, supra note 1.
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historical methods and modernist assumptions about the judicial
behavior of early twentieth-century Supreme Court Justices.' To
this end, White seeks to recapture the constitutional jurisprudential
debates of this era and to advance a more complicated and richly
nuanced account of transformative constitutional events. From this
perspective, the New Deal and the Court-packing plan recede in
importance as catalysts of constitutional change and instead become historical episodes stripped of their mythical importance,
which White attributes to the indiscriminate use of political labels
and behavioralist presuppositions of generations of scholars.' In
many respects, White succeeds in attaining his ambitious objective
and has written a compelling revisionist history of one of the more
controversial and misunderstood periods of American constitutional history.
This Book Review corresponds to White's method of complicating and revising the conventional perspective. After an
introductory discussion of the concept of revolution, Part I will address the conventional account of the constitutional revolution of
1937 and the factors White attributes to its enduring position of
distorted significance. Part II will examine and respond to White's
treatment of three areas of constitutional jurisprudence complicating the conventional account: foreign relations, administrative law,
and free speech. With much precision and careful analysis, White
illuminates the developments of these areas of law and, for the
most part, effectively supports his revised narrative of early twentieth-century constitutional change. Finally, in Part III, this Book
Review will examine the heart of White's effort, namely his alternative explanation for the transformation in early twentiethcentury constitutional jurisprudence, particularly his emphasis on
the ascendancy of modernism and the connection between the Supreme Court's internal intellectual climate and developments in
both private and public law jurisprudence. To this end, White offers a detailed and shrewd account of the relationship between the
formalism/realism debate in common law and the notion of constitutional adaptivity in political economy constitutional law. As I will
discuss below, White's analysis overlooks, at certain points, factors
26

Id. at 269-312.
- Id. at 2-4, 9-10, 14-15, 29, 32, 237-312.
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that would even more fully develop his already in-depth treatment
of this period of constitutional change. Nevertheless, he generally
succeeds in providing a reasoned, subtle, and persuasive revision of
the change in constitutional jurisprudence of the early twentieth
century.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION AS CONCEPT AND MYTH

Inherently ambiguous, the term "revolution" actually has multiple meanings, as it refers to three different types of change:
sudden, radical, or complete.' Therefore, unless carefully defined,
this word is susceptible to misuse and may create considerable confusion for those who try to gauge the significance of ideological
shifts. Moreover, the term itself may not be all that suitable for discussing the course of jurisprudential change in a legal system
marked by the prominence of stare decisis and evolving methods of
common law adjudication, both of which tend to constrain judges
from making sudden or radical departures from precedent. Brief
discussion of some of the analytical pitfalls that arise from indiscriminate use of the word "revolution" provides an essential
perspective from which to appreciate White's own characterization
of the pattern of constitutional development that occurred during
the first few decades of the twentieth century.
A. The Elusive Concept of ConstitutionalRevolution
Perhaps one problem with understanding the concept of a constitutional revolution lies in the difficulty of using the word
"revolution" to describe the transformation of constitutional
thought. In common parlance, the term "revolution" refers to an
abrupt or sudden change in the course of events, often precipitated
by a crisis of political, economic, social or cultural dimensions, that

2A
leading dictionary defines revolution as "a sudden, radical, or complete
change." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1010 (1986); see also Crane
Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution 3 (Vintage Books 1965) (1938) (noting
"[r]evolution is one of the looser words"). Brinton explains that "[tjhe term
'revolution' troubles the semanticist not only because of its wide range in popular
usage, but also because it is one of those words charged with emotional content." Id.
at 2.

2002]

Understandingthe New Deal Court

275

results in a sharp departure from previous norms. 9 Most nonhistorians tend to associate revolutions with singular events such as
the signing of the Declaration of Independence or the storming of
the Bastille that signify, from popular perspective, the formal beginnings of the American and French Revolutions, respectively.
However, neither of these revolutions really began in such glorious fashion. In fact, their origins arose from the culmination of a
series of conflicts marked by shifting ideas and values. To obtain a
proper sense of the American Revolution, for example, one must
consider the ideological fault lines in the relationship between the
colonies and the British foreign office as manifested in tensions
that erupted during the French and Indian War, the Stamp Act
controversy, and the Boston Massacre, to mention but a few seminal events, before one can begin to appreciate the context of the
Declaration of Independence, let alone what it meant to its signatories.' Similarly, the root causes of the French Revolution
emanated from institutional weaknesses of the monarchy and longstanding strife between the social classes rather than the fleeting
political episodes that led to the assault upon the Bastille in the
summer of 1789."'
By placing inordinate emphasis upon certain occurrences and, in
some cases, particular people, revolutionary myths often distort the
ideas that compelled change and oversimplify conflicting patterns
of thought. They also obscure the structural aspects of transformation. What is so often left, then, is a fragment of history devoid of
any real context and susceptible to manipulation by those who
mine historical facts in the pursuit of data intended to advance certain political or legal arguments. In this sense, the term
29 Brinton, supra note 28, at 3-5, 15-20, 24-25 (discussing the differences between
popular and scientific conceptions of revolutions and the task of understanding their
structure). See generally Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3d
ed. 1996) (discussing the incremental nature of ideological revolutions).
0See generally Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American

Revolution (1967) (discussing the ideas that led to the American Revolution);

Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1992) (same).
-,1 See generally Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution (1947)
(discussing the ideological antecedents of the French Revolution); R.R. Palmer, The
Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America,
1760-1800-The Struggle 5-65, 99-131 (1964) (discussing the origins of the French
Revolution and its initial aftermath); see also generally Brinton, supra note 28, at 72101 (discussing the initial stages of revolutions).
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"revolution" becomes convoluted and loses historical precision, for
not every complete systematic political or legal transformation
necessarily signifies change that occurred either suddenly or in a
particularly radical manner. Yet this is what conventional American constitutional history would have one believe about the
purported constitutional revolution of 1937. A principal objective
of White's book, therefore, is to demonstrate the fallacy of presuming the Supreme Court abruptly altered its jurisprudential course
to accommodate social, economic and political change. Implicitly
what he suggests is that much of the misunderstanding about the
1930s Court reflects analytical difficulties arising from misconceptions about the nature of constitutional revolution.
B. ConstitutionalRevolution as Myth and the Problem of
Perspective
In the aftermath of the social and economic turmoil of the 1930s,
a narrative emerged that sought to explain the apparent shift in the
Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence of political economy.
Initially crafted by contemporary observers of the Court and later
refined by others, this account described doctrinal changes in the
Court's Due Process and Commerce Clause jurisprudence as revolutionary and placed considerable emphasis upon the New Deal
itself and the Court-packing plan as the catalysts for this jurisprudential shift.' Regarded by some as a cautionary tale about the
proper role of an unelected judiciary in a constitutional democracy,33 the notion that a constitutional revolution occurred between
1935 and 1937 had, by mid-century, assumed symbolic importance
as an example of how political forces shape legal doctrine in this
country. For the most part, the authors of this version of constitutional history were not only the New Dealers who had witnessed
the belated triumphs of their reform programs, ' but also influential
See generally Corwin, supra note 13, at 39-79 (emphasizing the role of the Court-

packing plan in the Court's New Deal legislation decisions); Corwin, supra note 2
(analyzing judicial review as an instrument of popular government heavily influenced
by public opinion).
33See, e.g., Rodell, supra note 14, at 213-54.
mFor example, Professor Edward Corwin consulted with the Roosevelt
Administration about its Court-packing plan. See white, supra note 1, at 319 n.3. In
addition, Jerome Frank served as an attorney in the Agricultural Adjustment
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members of the press and academics, among them leading political
scientists35 and previous critics of the Court's "mechanical jurisprudence." 6
Over time, this conventional narrative, with its emphasis on political causation in the transformation of Supreme Court doctrine,
took hold and has, as White details at the end of his book, wielded
considerable influence upon the way in which both those within
and outside of the legal profession regard judicial review and the
evolution of constitutional doctrines.' Indeed, many old New
Dealers went on to teach at leading law schools throughout the nation and, through their constitutional law casebooks and classroom
instruction, reinforced the notion that the Court essentially
switched jurisprudential course in response to the external pressures of New Deal politics. Not surprisingly, some of their best
students who succeeded them at the lectern have continued to perpetuate some of the mythology surrounding the constitutional
revolution of 1937.'
A principal characteristic of mainstream accounts of Supreme
Court decisionmaking during the 1930s is their tendency to compress the chronology of change into a few short years, thus making
Administration and at the Securities and Exchange Commission. Peter H. Irons, The
New Deal Lawyers 299 (1982). For discussion of the seminal influence of New Deal
lawyers upon the post-New Deal legal profession and at the nation's elite law schools,
see id. at 295-99.
Prominent political scientists in this group were Edward Corwin of Princeton and
-,Benjamin Wright of Harvard.
6This phrase comes from the title of an influential law review article critical of
Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,
8 Colum. L. Rev. 605 (1908). See generally Rodell, supra note 14, at 213-54 (decrying

the conservatism of the Court).
-3White, supra note 1, at 11-20, 237-39, 269-312.
In this regard, consider the following passage from a leading constitutional law
casebook:
While opposition to Roosevelt's plan was mounting in the Congress, actions by
the Supreme Court did more to thwart the plan. Although the plan was

effectively defeated in Congress in June of 1937 when the Senate Judiciary
Committee reported it with an unfavorable recommendation, the Court-

packing plan may have had its intended effect. On April 12, 1937, the Justices
who decided Schechter and Carter decided National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, upholding the National Labor
Relations Act against the Commerce Clause challenge of a large, national steel

company.
Dan Braveman et al., Constitutional Law: Structure and Rights in Our Federal
System 333 (4th ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
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it seem as if the Supreme Court abruptly and radically altered its
jurisprudence in response to the external pressures of New Deal
politics and the inexorable progress of social and economic reform.
Rather than consider the trajectory of doctrinal change over decades, as ably demonstrated, for example, by White and Cushman,
conventional analysis of Supreme Court precedent from the 1930s
often seems to regard the Court as an adjunct political branch and
places more emphasis upon the immediate results of its decisions
during this time than on how the Justices reached their conclusions.
White and other revisionist historians, however, reject this
model of early twentieth-century constitutional change as overly
simplistic and instead suggest that although a fairly complete transformation in constitutional thought occurred, it proceeded much
more slowly in some respects and in less linear fashion than described in conventional accounts.39 Viewed from this perspective,
what happened between the 1920s and the early 1940s was not a
revolution in the sense of an abrupt or sudden change in constitutional doctrine as much as a series of shifts, at times almost
imperceptible and seemingly contradictory, that marked a gradual
transition from orthodox constitutional notions of judicial review
to a more instrumental model of constitutional interpretation
through which an emerging majority of the Supreme Court Justices
adapted constitutional provisions to changing economic and social
conditions. 1937, therefore, was not the end of this transformation
but rather a point along the way.
C. PoliticalLabels and BehavioralistAssumptions
White attributes some of the mythology arising from the constitutional revolution of 1937 to the generation of New Dealers who
chronicled the triumph of their policies and to their contemporaries who invariably described the process of constitutional change in
political terms.' In so doing, they tended to overlook the delicate
web of constitutional doctrines formed as a result of long-term internal debates within the Court over the nature of constitutional
limitations and the permissible scope of public regulation of private
39See,

e.g., Cushman, supra note 21 (arguing that external pressures on the Court

were not as influential as conventional wisdom suggests).
40White,

supra note 1, at 14-18, 269-312.

2002]

Understandingthe New Deal Court

279

economic affairs and free expression. Rather than try to reconstruct the jurisprudential premises of early twentieth-century jurists
who struggled to reconcile the meaning of constitutional provisions
with the social and economic demands of a society in flux, commentators interpreted constitutional precedent through the prism
of politics and, more often than not, linked judicial decisionmaking
during the early decades of the twentieth century to the perceived
social, political, and economic attitudes of the Justices."
As a result, political labels were used to describe the process of
constitutional adjudication during the 1930s and previous decades.
Political terms such as "liberal" and "conservative," "progressive"
and "reactionary" dominated commentary about the Court and its
Justices. Insofar as this terminology seemingly made the process of
constitutional adjudication more accessible to the public and appeared to remove the veil of mystique from the early twentiethcentury Court, it also oversimplified constitutional doctrines and
distorted judicial behavior. Jurists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes
and Louis Brandeis, White notes, were viewed as "progressive"
and "liberal" on the basis of a handful of Supreme Court opinions,42 whereas dissenters from the Court's relatively deferential
economic regulation decisions of the mid- to late-1930s were as'
signed the pejorative labels of "reactionary" and "conservative,"43
even though a few years before they held mainstream constitu-

41

See, e.g., Rodell, supra note 14, at 213-54. See generally Drew Pearson & Robert
S. Allen, The Nine Old Men (1937) (linking the constitutional jurisprudence of
members of the Hughes Court to their political views).
42 White, supra note 1, at 285; see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (articulating the importance of free speech in a
constitutional democracy); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567-71 (1923)

(Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing liberty of contract); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (articulating the importance of free

speech in a constitutional democracy); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing liberty of contract).

See, e.g., Pearson & Allen, supra note 41, at 134-138 (describing Justice Butler's
conservative views); id. at 139-41, 159-62 (describing Justice Owen J. Roberts's

reactionary streak); id. at 186, 192, 195, 197 (describing Justice Van Devanter's
conservatism); id. at 198-206 (describing Justice Sutherland's penchant for protecting
property rights and attributing to him an aversion toward industrial reform); id. at
222-37 (characterizing Justice McReynolds as both reactionary and stupid) (1936);

Rodell, supra note 14, at 213-54 (describing the pattern of Supreme Court
adjudication in New Deal cases).
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tional views' and some, like then-Senator George Sutherland, had
previously endorsed "progressive" reforms such as workmen's
compensation45 and women's suffrage."
Indeed, Justice Sutherland's record both before and after he
joined the Court presents something of a paradox that calls into
question the facile characterization of him as either "conservative"
or "reactionary." For example, as a member of the Utah legislature
he helped draft maximum hours legislation applicable to the mining industry,4 7 while on the Court he often invoked liberty of
contract as a constitutional challenge to economic regulation of
private businesses.' Yet Justice Sutherland's penchant for property
rights did not prevent him from recognizing the virtue of some
Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter, each of whom was
part of the majority in both Adkins, 261 U.S. at 525, and Tyson & Brother v. Banton,
273 U.S. 418 (1927), dissented in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937).
4' With regard to the need for a workmen's compensation law for railroad
employees, then-Senator Sutherland remarked: "We must take care that these people
do not become wrecks, human driftwood in society. That is one object of this
legislation. The law of negligence is hard; it is unjust, it is cruel in its operation. The
law of compensation proceeds upon broad humanitarian principles." 48 Cong. Rec.
4846, 4853 (1912) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). The following year, Sutherland
reiterated the importance of workmen's compensation as a means of helping the
victims of industrial accidents. See George Sutherland, The Economic Value and
Social Justice of a Compulsory and Exclusive Workmen's Compensation Law,
Address Before the Third Annual Convention of the International Association of
Casualty and Surety Underwriters (July 14, 1913) (transcript available in the
Sutherland Papers at the Library of Congress), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 131, at 11-12
(1913). In 1916, Sutherland introduced in Congress a workmen's compensation bill for
employees of the federal government. See 53 Cong. Rec. 452 (1916) (statement of
Sen. Sutherland).
46Then-Senator Sutherland stated:
I give my assent to woman suffrage because.., there is no justification for
denying to half our citizens the right to participate in the operations of a
government which is as much their government as it is ours upon the sole
ground that they happen to be born women instead of men.
51 Cong. Rec. 3598, 3601 (1914) (statement of Sen. Sutherland). In 1915, Sutherland
introduced a joint resolution in favor of a constitutional amendment extending to
women the right to vote. See 53 Cong. Rec. 75 (1915) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
See Joel Francis Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland: a Man Against the State 36
(1951). The Supreme Court upheld this legislation in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898).
4-See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 406-14 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928); Tyson & Brother,273 U.S. at 429-31; Adkins, 261 U.S. at 525.
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forms of public control of private economic activity. In this regard,
his opinion in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' 9 which upheld a zoning
ordinance as a legitimate exercise of local police powers, presumably contradicts the popular notion of Justice Sutherland as a
reactionary jurist. Similarly, some of his criminal procedure opinions ° reveal compassion and concern for fair play rarely attributed
to Justice Sutherland by conventional commentators.
White posits that with the ascendance by the 1930s of behavioralist assumptions about adjudication, the notion that Supreme
Court Justices could not necessarily separate their personal views
from the methodology of constitutional interpretation resonated
powerfully with critics of the Court's orthodox constitutional jurisprudence of the twentieth century's early decades.5' Essentially,
what White suggests is that once the theory of judicial behaviorialism attained widespread acceptance it provided a convenient afterthe-fact rationale for explaining the jurisprudential shift of the
Court during the 1930s. It also encouraged the continued use of political labels to describe judicial behavior, even when such labels
were inaccurate or somewhat deceiving, as in what White identifies
as the deification of Justices Holmes and Brandeis and the demonization of Justice Sutherland. 2 According to White, none of
these jurists entirely deserves his reputation in constitutional history,' and though detailed examination of their judicial careers is
beyond the scope of his study, White manages to make a fairly
convincing argument that the pervasive influence of behavioralist

,1272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also Olken, supra note 10, at 79 (discussing Euclid).
50See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (invalidating a criminal
conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932) (invoking the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of a defendant in a capital

felony case).
$,See White, supra note 1, at 237-312.
51Id. at 269-301. See generally Silas Bent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1932)
(highly complimentary biography of Justice Holmes); Alpheus Thomas Mason,
Brandeis: a Free Man's Life (1946) (flattering portrayal of Justice Brandeis); Pearson
& Allen, supra note 41, at 116-38 (criticizing Justice Butler); id. at 186-97 (mocking
Justice Van Devanter); id. at 198-206 (belittling Justice Sutherland); id. at 222-237
(describing Justice McReynolds as tragic).
-3White, supra note 1, at 269-301. For an example of revisionist analysis of Justice
Sutherland, see generally Olken, supra note 10 (reappraising Justice Sutherland's
jursiprudence of economic liberty and refuting notions that natural law, laissez-faire
economics, or Social Darwinism influenced his views).
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theories of adjudication throughout much of the twentieth century
is largely responsible for the persistent mythology that surrounds
the New Deal Court and its members.
In this regard, White sparingly uses the term "revolution" to describe the course of change in constitutional interpretation during
the first half of the twentieth century, preferring instead to use
terms such as "transformation" and "transition," which more precisely and carefully characterize the intellectual context in which
Supreme Court Justices altered conceptual paradigms of constitutional law. 4 Rather than employ conventional labels such as
"conservative" or "reactionary," he characterizes traditional notions of judicial review as "orthodox" or "guardian."55 At times,
White even juxtaposes these terms in order to convey a more accurate sense of the prevalent jurisprudential premise eventually
displaced throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s by "the living
' and its more flexible notion of constitutional
Constitution theory"56
adaptivity. In the lexicon of White's narrative these are far more
instructive than the comparatively empty adjectives "liberal" and
"progressive."
D. The Distinction Between Law and Politics
In essence, the conventional view that the Supreme Court overhauled its constitutional jurisprudence in reaction to the external

mWhite, however, uses the term "revolution" to characterize doctrinal change
between the 1920s and the 1940s concerning matters of political economy. White,
supra note 1, at 198-204. In large part, what he considers revolutionary is the broad
scope of substantive change that occurred during this period as the Court gradually
discarded many of its orthodox constitutional tenets. For White, therefore, it is the
complete nature of the transformation in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence of
political economy that rendered it revolutionary. Id. at 198-268. In this context, he
narrowly invokes the concept of revolution to describe the scope of change yet
expressly refuses to characterize the pace of such doctrinal change as revolutionary.
Id. at passim. In this sense, then, his understanding of the constitutional revolution
that occurred during the 1930s and into the 1940s is both more precise than and
fundamentally distinct from conventional narratives that suggest the Court abruptly
altered its constitutional jurisprudence in response to the external pressures of New
Deal politics.
5-Id. at 36-37, 96, 131, 168-69, 225-27, 232-33, 245-54, 269, 299-300, 306-07.
165See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426-28, 435, 443

(1934) (illustrating a flexible interpretation of the Contract Clause inlight of changing
economic conditions).
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pressures of New Deal politics and that the swiftness of this transformation rendered it revolutionary ignores the fundamental
distinction between law and politics.7' As White explains at great
length in his book, the pace of change was gradual, a bit uneven,
and far from complete by the end of the 1930s. From a methodological standpoint, White's revisionism diverges from the
traditional account because, unlike the political scientists and early
commentators of the Hughes Court, he focuses on the historical
development of constitutional thought. This is of particular importance because judicial review differs from political action even
though many legal issues derive from political conflicts.'
Supreme Court justices interpret the Constitution and use it to
resolve questions of law constrained, in large part, by the common
law doctrine of stare decisis. Respect for legal precedent is the
hallmark of the judicial function and usually tempers the pace of
change.s9 Common law methods of applying precedent inform the
process of constitutional adjudication in which judges concern
themselves primarily with the development of enduring legal principles rather than expedient resultsf In this regard, White's book is
of particular value because of its emphasis upon changes in the
structure of constitutional thought and its demonstration that much
17See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164-66, 169-70 (1803)
(distinguishing between questions of law and non-justiciable political questions).
'See generally Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution 341-78 (1987)
(discussing the nature of constitutional adjudication).
.1See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 9-31, 142-67 (1921)
(discussing common law adjudication and the evolution of precedent). Of particular
relevance are two points made by Cardozo. He wrote:
[I]n a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have so covered the
ground that they fix the point of departure from which the labor of the judges

begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to examine and compare them. If they
are plain and to the point, there may be need of nothing more. Stare decisis is at
least the everyday working rule of our law.
Id. at 19-20.
I think

adherence

to

precedent

should

be

the

rule and

not

the

exception.... But I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to
precedent, though it ought not to be abandoned, ought to be in some degree

relaxed. I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has
been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social
welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.
Id. at 149-50.
10See Olken, supra note 10, at 33-35, 74-79 (discussing common law and historical

custom in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century constitutional interpretation).
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of the ideological shift occurred as a result of ongoing debates
within the Court about the nature of constitutional law and judicial
review.
Notwithstanding their disputes over the meaning and adaptation
of constitutional provisions and differences of temperament and
personal politics, every member of the Hughes Court implicitly
understood that the legitimacy of the Court derived from its function to decide legal, as opposed to political, disputes. Therefore, to
ascribe political motives to the judicial behavior of early twentiethcentury Supreme Court Justices evinces a profound misconception
of constitutional adjudication. Indeed, even members of the Court
such as Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, who chafed at their
brethren's reluctance to reconsider precedent or reexamine jurisprudential premises, did not necessarily attribute political or
socioeconomic bias to their colleagues,6 nor did they hastily depart
from the analytical structure of traditional constitutional arguments.' Over time their views prevailed, yet by placing inordinate
emphasis upon the end result, the mainstream account of a New
Deal-inspired constitutional revolution distorts the context of the
changes that occurred in judicial review and reduces the Justices to
political actors. White's principal task, therefore, is to recast the

6

1 In a memorial tribute to the late Supreme Court Justice Willis Van Devanter,
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone had this to say about his former colleague, with
whom he was often in disagreement about the constitution limits of public regulation
of private economic affairs:
In the provisions of the Constitution, and particularly the Fifth and
Fourteen[th] Amendments, he (Mr. Justice Van Devanter) saw safeguards to
those rights and privileges of the individual which he regarded as the chief
spiritual values of the society which he had known in his own life and

experience. Those who differed with him differed not in their appraisal of such
values but in their judgment that an instrument of government, intended to
endure for ages to come, could not rightly be interpreted as casting a dynamic
society in so rigid a mold. Both were content to resolve their differences by the
appeal to reason in the course of adjudication. Both would have regarded as
inappropriate and inept the labelling of their differing views of the appropriate
boundaries of constitutional power as either conservative or liberal.

Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, Memorial to Justice Van Devanter, (Address delivered
at the United States Supreme Court, Wash., D.C.) (March 16, 1942) (transcript
available in the Harlan F. Stone Papers at the Library of Congress).
62

See generally Cushman, supra note 21 (discussing the structure of early twentieth-

century change in constitutional interpretation); White, supra note 1 (same).

2002]

Understandingthe New Deal Court

285

narrative of constitutional transformation so that the focus is on
ideological patterns rather than political events.
II. THE VIRTUES OF COMPLICATING CONVENTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

In the first section of his book, White sets out to complicate the
conventional narrative about early twentieth-century constitutional
change in order to reveal some of its insular assumptions and logical contradictions. Rather than delve into the most prominent
aspect of the story, the Supreme Court's jurisprudential shift in issues involving political economy, White demonstrates that before
the New Deal a transformation was well underway in other facets
of public law. Against the backdrop of the growing influence of
modernity in American thought, the Court began to alter its jurisprudential concepts of foreign relations and administrative law
during the initial decades of the twentieth century. In addition, increased judicial recognition of free speech as an essential attribute
of democratic civic virtue presaged the eventual separation of economic liberty from First Amendment rights integral to the model
of bifurcated judicial review characteristic of modern constitutional
law.
A. ForeignRelations
Through extensive historical analysis, White shows the tenuous
connection between the New Deal and doctrinal changes within
the Court's jurisprudence of foreign affairs. In so doing, he refutes
the importance of the New Deal as a causal agent of jurisprudential
change and instead suggests that a multitude of factors shaped the
course of early twentieth-century judicial review. Several years before the New Deal, White explains, the Court had begun to
question the applicability of orthodox constitutional tenets to executive agreements and other instruments of foreign policy, whose
relative informality distinguished them from treaties that required
Senate ratification. In 1892, for example, it upheld an executive
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agreement challenged as violating separation of powers.' Moreover, as White indicates, in both the Chinese Exclusion64 and
Insular Cases' of the late nineteenth century, the Court appeared
to recognize the fledgling concept of inherent national sovereignty
as an extraconstitutional basis for upholding broad federal powers
in foreign relations.
Over the course of nearly four decades, the Supreme Court
adopted a more deferential stance toward executive branch action
in international affairs. Traditional judicial interpretation strictly
construed the scope of enumerated federal authority and applied
the notion of reserved state powers as an additional constitutional
limitation upon the national government in the realm of foreign affairs.' Increasing tensions and complexities within the nation's
international relations, however, necessitated the exercise of considerable unilateral presidential discretion in the resolution of
disputes. Throughout the 1920s and into the 1940s, the Court
moved away from an orthodox conception of judicial review in this
area toward a pragmatic approach that regarded foreign affairs as
analytically distinct from domestic legal issues. No longer were the
doctrines of separation of powers and dual federalism the linchpins
of a constitutional jurisprudence of foreign relations. For example, in 1920, Justice Holmes invoked the notion of inherent

Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (upholding a provision of the Tariff Act of 1890
that conferred upon the President the discretion to lift exemptions from importation
duties on certain agricultural goods).
64Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding the federal
government's inherent authority to deport aliens); Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581 (1889) (sustaining a federal law prohibiting Chinese laborers from
63

coming into the United States).

65 See, e.g., Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley
v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);

Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S.
222 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
1 (1901). The main insular decision, Downes, upheld the Foraker Act tariff on goods
imported and exported between the United States and its territory of Puerto Rico.
See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("The treaty power, as
expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which
are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its
departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of
the67States.").

White, supra note 1, at 36, 61.
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national sovereignty in a decision that upheld the supremacy of a
federal treaty over local police powers.'
For White, a key figure in this jurisprudential transition was
George Sutherland, who before joining the Supreme Court articulated a theory of judicial deference in foreign relations that marked
a significant departure from the traditional view that, as in domestic affairs, the Court should narrowly construe the scope of federal
enumerated powers and preserve the delicate balance between national and local interests affected by international matters. As a
member of the United States Senate, Sutherland, however, criticized dogged adherence to orthodox constitutional tenets that had
the effect of restricting presidential discretion to make foreign policy and suggested that a distinction existed between the external
and internal affairs of the country. In external affairs, he posited,
the federal government should enjoy the attributes of inherent national sovereignty derived from the nation's independent status in
the world order and not be subject to undue restraint in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy." Conversely, with
respect to domestic issues, he believed the Constitution, with its
carefully prescribed enumerated powers, required the Supreme
Court to adumbrate the limits of governmental authority and preserve individual liberty from the arbitrary actions of public officials
and the tyranny of democratic majorities."
White notes that Sutherland refined his views in the Blumenthal
lectures he delivered at Columbia University in 1918, two years after he left the Senate and three years before he became a Justice
on the Supreme Court. In those lectures, the retired lawmaker asserted that inherent national sovereignty in foreign relations was
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding a treaty protecting the
migration of birds).
69George Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the National
Government (1909), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 61-417 (1910).
70George Sutherland, Principle or Expedient?, Address Before the New York State
Bar Association 8-9 (Jan. 21, 1921) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers at

the Library of Congress).
The guaranties for safe-guarding life, liberty and property, freedom of speech,
of the press and of religious worship, and all the other guaranties of the
Constitution, would be of little value if their interpretation and enforcement

depended upon arbitrary, shifting, temporary official edicts instead of the calm,
judgment of the judiciary under the general law of the land.

Id. at 11.
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an essential exercise of extra-constitutional power warranted by
both the nature of international affairs and the historical fact that
upon the formation of the United States only the federal government had powers of external sovereignty.7 '
Nearly two decades later, toward the end of his judicial tenure
and at the height of mounting tension within the Court over the
permissible scope of public regulation of private economic activity,
a majority of the Justices adopted Justice Sutherland's views. In
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,' the Court upheld a
joint resolution of Congress that conferred broad discretion in the
President to issue an embargo on the sale of weapons to countries
at war. One year later in United States v. Belmont,73 the Court ruled
unnecessary Senate ratification of an international agreement
which, when executed by the President, interfered with private citizens' claims for just compensation.74 Justice Sutherland, not
surprisingly, wrote the majority opinion in both cases, resting the
broad exercise of executive branch discretion and concomitant judicial deference upon the distinction between the internal and
external powers of the government 5 and the practical need for
vesting the president with nearly exclusive authority to conduct
foreign relations. 6 White correctly sees these judicial decisions as
representing the culmination of Justice Sutherland's attempt to alter the constitutional jurisprudence of foreign relations.'
White's decision to emphasize Justice Sutherland's role in this
transformation is critical to his larger points about the historiography concerning the New Deal Court. At the same time Justice
Sutherland led the movement toward judicial deference in foreign
relations, in the domestic realm he steadfastly resisted departing

George Sutherland, Constitutional Power and World Affairs 24-191 (1919).
- 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
301 U.S. 324 (1937)
74Id.
75Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. at 315-16.
76Id. at 319-20.
71

For criticism of Justice Sutherland's approach, see generally David M. Levitan,
The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55
Yale L.J. 467 (1946) (disagreeing with Justice Sutherland's theories of inherent
sovereignty and extra-constitutional authority).
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from the rigid categorical jurisprudence of police powers 8 and the
formalistic notion of separation of powers characteristic of orthodox constitutionalism.79 White notes that this apparent dichotomy
within Justice Sutherland's public law jurisprudence does not fit
neatly within the conventional view of Justice Sutherland as a judicial reactionary and apostle of property rights.' After all, both
Curtiss-Wrightand Belmont were cases in which the Court upheld
the broad discretion of the executive branch in foreign affairs to
the detriment of litigants who claimed federal policies interfered
with their private property rights. They also exemplified the type of
pragmatic constitutional adjudication Justice Sutherland decried in
his more important economic liberty dissents.'
Traditional historical analysis of the New Deal Court accounts
neither for this ironic contrast in Justice Sutherland's judicial behavior nor for the significant patterns of jurisprudential change in
public law that preceded the New Deal. In this regard, White's
careful documentation of the origins of this doctrinal transition
raises significant doubts about the accuracy of an historical account
that makes the New Deal, with its domestic agenda, the cynosure
of a constitutional revolution. Moreover, his portrayal of Justice
Sutherland as a jurist who recognized the importance of adapting
American constitutional law and judicial review to accommodate
changes in international policy calls into question the accuracy of
using political labels such as "reactionary" or even "conservative"
to summarize the whole of his constitutional jurisprudence.

7 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 401-14 (1937) (Sutherland,
J., dissenting); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
"See, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431-33 (1935) (invalidating
the "hot oil" provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act as an unconstitutional
delegation of lawmaking power).

1 White, supra note 1, at 82. For an example of conventional disparagement, see
Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Conservative World of Mr. Justice Sutherland, 18831910, 32 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 443 (1938) (generally criticizing Justice Sutherland and

ascribing to him a penchant for natural rights, Social Darwinism, and laissez-faire
economics).

"ISee, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 401-05 (Sutherland, J., dissenting);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-53, 472-73, 483 (1934)

(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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Though White never really explains the reasons for the duality
of Justice Sutherland's constitutional thought,n nor that of other
members of the Court, who, in effect, seemed to switch positions
on domestic and international issues,' the fact that he highlights
this contradiction is significant. At the very least, it belies the myth
of a monolithic conservatism from which the Court emerged during
the 1930s and offers in its place a more nuanced chronicle of
change that did not reach its crescendo until the 1940s.' Doing this
in the opening chapters of the book is particularly effective because it introduces the reader to the scope of White's revised
narrative and his methodology.
B. Administrative Law
White further complicates conventional constitutional history
with his analysis of the development of administrative law during
the first half of the twentieth century. Unlike foreign relations,
where the bulk of doctrinal change preceded the New Deal, here
the most significant shift from an orthodox theory of separation of
powers occurred in the decade after the purported constitutional
revolution of 1937 with the debates that led to the passage of the

-' White attributes the contrast in Justice Sutherland's domestic and international
jurisprudential views to his "intuitive belief that the foreign relations sphere was
'different' from the domestic sphere, jurisprudentially, politically, and perhaps
constitutionally." White, supra note 1, at 82. However, the dichotomy in Justice
Sutherland's thought may be exaggerated. Fundamentally averse to political factions,
Justice Sutherland, a former United States Senator, may have realized that it was in
the best interests of the country to permit the President a broad measure of discretion
given the political factions in Congress. For discussion of Justice Sutherland's
factional aversion, see Olken, supra note 10, at 36-88. Justice Sutherland's fervent
patriotism may also explain his views about jurisprudence of foreign relations. See
Joel Francis Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland: a Man Against the State 93-95, 226-32
(1951).
83 Justices Brandeis and Benjamin Cardozo were part of the Curtiss-Wrightmajority,
but, together with then-Justice Stone, dissented in Belmont. In general, they were
much more deferential toward the exercise of governmental power to regulate
domestic economic matters. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
280-311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (applying the Supremacy
Clause to the Litvinov Assignment and upholding presidential discretion to
implement this executive agreement's provisions).
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Administrative Procedure Act. 5 White asserts that the body of
administrative law that evolved by the end of the 1940s was actually a by-product of both longstanding orthodox criticisms of
agencies and emerging modern theories about law and government
spawned
in large part by the growing complexity of industrial soci86
ety.
At the outset of the twentieth century, the predominant model
of constitutional adjudication regarded the Constitution as a series
of essential principles that judges strictly construed to maintain the
limits of governmental authority. White aptly identifies this judicial
method as guardian review, noting that late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century jurists perceived they were guardians entrusted
with the solemn task of monitoring the prescribed boundaries of
public power within a constitutional democracy.' Administrative
agencies posed considerable problems in this regard because their
mixture of executive, rulemaking, and judicial functions seemingly
violated the strict conception of separation of powers integral to
guardian review. Indeed, from this perspective, courts often questioned the validity of agency decisions throughout the early
decades of the twentieth century.'
Yet, as White demonstrates, during this period a series of extraconstitutional arguments emerged that sought to validate the role
of agencies in modern American government. Harvard Professors
Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and James Landis, as well as
several other prominent legal academicians, criticized orthodox notions of law that viewed delegations of lawmaking authority to
specialized agencies as illegitimate. Instead, they posited that agencies with experts empowered to investigate conditions, prescribe
rules, and enforce them represented the most effective means for
government to resolve many of the socioeconomic problems en"'Ch.324,

60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706

(2001)).
1 White, supra note 1, at 96.
67See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (noting that "courts are not
bound by mere forms ... [t]hey are at liberty-indeed under a solemn duty-to look
at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the
legislature has transcended the limits of its authority"); see also Thomas M. Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of
the States of the American Union 129,160,168, 192 (Da Capo Press ed. 1972) (1868).
1 White, supra note 1, at 96-98.
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gendered by the growth of industrial America.' Linking these arguments to the advent of modernism in intellectual thought, White
explains that proponents of administrative agencies considered
them an essential device in the pursuit of democracy; their faith in
the agency form reflected the conviction that humans could largely
control the course of their lives?
Between the 1920s and 1940s, the debate over the legitimacy of
administrative agencies surfaced not only in academic literature
but also in the Supreme Court. White attributes the modest success
of agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Power Commission, the Federal Communications Commission,
and the Interstate Commerce Commission, each of which prevailed
in constitutional challenges before the Court, 9' to several factors.
Notwithstanding their broad regulatory standards, these agencies
derived their authority from fairly uncontroversial enumerated
constitutional powers and were administered by officials of independent appointment whose discretion was subject to judicial
review. In contrast, some of the agencies created during the initial
phase of the New Deal emanated from more attenuated constitutional authority and featured administrators from the very
industries subject to regulation.' These differences, White believes,
in large part explain why the Supreme Court invalidated portions

s9E.g., James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) (discussing the
expertise, efficiency, and tripartite functions of administrative agencies).
90White, supra note 1, at 114-16.
91See, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936) (deferring to
Federal Communications Commission decisions made within the scope of agency
power); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (recognizing the
validity of a congressional delegation of power to the Federal Trade Commission
given the quasi-legislative, rather than legislative, nature of the power); United States
v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932) (presuming the legitimacy of the Federal Power
Commission); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894)
(upholding the Interstate Commerce Act).
supra note 1, at 112-14. In 1944, Chief Justice Stone explained that one
9White,
flaw with the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, an early New Deal measure
intended to prescribe industrial regulations to promote economic stability during the
Depression, was that "[tihe function of formulating the codes was delegated, not to a
public official responsible to Congress or the Executive, but to private individuals
engaged in the industries to be regulated." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424

(1944).
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of the National Industrial Recovery Act9 ("NIRA") and the Guffey Coal Acte during the 1930s as unconstitutional delegations of
legislative power, yet upheld other delegations in cases from the
preceding decade.
Two other reasons not mentioned by White may also explain
this pattern of adjudication. Laws such as the NIRA were hastily
enacted at the outset of the New Deal and thus not carefully
drafted. Replete with constitutional infirmities, they were ripe for
invalidation by the Court.95 Moreover, counsel for the government
did not necessarily make effective arguments before the Court in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States and PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan 7, relying more upon speculation than careful
analysis of the facts.'
White effectively de-politicizes the New Deal non-delegation
cases by placing them within the larger context of modernity and
the evolving separation of the field of administrative law from traditional constitutional law. He considers the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 the endpoint of this transition and notes that many of the procedural limitations it imposed
upon agencies in terms of judicial review, the separation of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions, and the requirement that
agencies publish their decisions marked the reconciliation of orthodox and modern constitutional tendencies." This is in stark
contrast to the conventional wisdom that in the aftermath of the
New Deal an instrumental constitutionalism swept aside all vestiges of the old constitutional order. White, however', provides a
fresh perspective on the development of twentieth-century admin-

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating

the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the National Industrial

Recovery Act on both Commerce Clause and non-delegation doctrine grounds); Pan.
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating the "hot oil" provision of the
National Industrial Recovery Act as an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking
power).
91Carter Coal Co. v. Carter, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (finding unconstitutional the
delegation of regulatory power to private individuals in the coal industry).
95Cushman, supra note 21, at 36-38.
9 Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 495.
9
Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 388.
9 Cushman, supra note 21, at 38-39, 156-58.

" White, supra note 1, at 118-25.
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istrative law that suggests a more realistic interplay occurred between conventional and modem ideas.
C. The Emergence of Free Speech
One of the more interesting sections of White's book involves
his illuminating discussion of free speech between the 1920s and
1940s. Traditionally, scholars have associated the Court's increased
solicitude for expression and other core First Amendment rights
°
with the decline in judicial scrutiny of economic regulations." Of
particular relevance to this notion is a footnote from a 1938 due
process decision in which Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous
Court, suggested a more rigorous level of judicial review was appropriate in cases involving non-economic rights or the apparent
failure of the political process to protect discrete and insular minorities."' Within the context of upholding, pursuant to the rational
basis test, a federal law that proscribed the interstate shipment of
skimmed milk, Justice Stone remarked: "There may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth. ' ' "° Often regarded as a symbolic expression of judicial
objectives in the aftermath of the New Deal constitutional "revolution," Justice Stone's celebrated footnote appeared to herald the
adoption of a bifurcated scheme of judicial review marked by deference to public control of private economic affairs and heightened
scrutiny of laws that restricted First Amendment liberties.
White, however, views this conception of constitutional history
as flawed and oversimplistic. Interestingly, he attributes much of
the fault in this regard to Justice Stone himself, whom White thinks
may have overstated the Court's willingness in 1938 to abandon
guardian review of unenumerated economic rights and the breadth
of its fundamental liberties jurisprudence." In addition, White

110
See, e.g.,

Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 485 (13th

ed. 1997).
10OUnited States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,152-53 n.4 (1938).

Id.

102

supra note 1, at 130-31. White believes footnote 4 in Carolene Products
obscures the fact that the Justices decided early twentieth-century free speech cases
3

10 White,
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finds it ironic that insofar as Justice Stone endorsed close judicial
scrutiny of some laws that resulted from the tyranny of democratic
majorities, the First Amendment opinions he cited sought to "reinforc[e] the ideal of majoritarian democracy."'" For White this
internal contradiction, in part, underscores the misleading nature
of Justice Stone's footnote.
Though White is undoubtedly correct about the hyperbolic
characteristics of Justice Stone's footnote, it is not necessarily true
that, in 1938, it was inconsistent, from the perspective of democratic values, to conflate judicial intervention on behalf of discrete
and insular minorities tyrannized by the excesses of democratic
majorities with increasing judicial review of laws that threatened to
thwart democratic participation through restrictions upon expression. Indeed, the two rationales for heightened judicial scrutiny
were quite consistent in that they both sought to preserve the integrity of the democratic process, albeit in different ways. For
example, Justice Brandeis, one of the principal proponents of expanded judicial review in free speech cases involving matters of
public discussion, also expressed considerable tolerance for the exercise of local police powers that restricted economic liberty
because of his belief in the virtues of the laboratories of democracy." However, Justice Brandeis also subjected to close judicial
examination a handful of regulations whose discriminatory effects
he believed impeded the equal operation of the law and undermined democratic values."°
from the perspective of guardian review and not the bifurcated review commonly
associated with the modem jurisprudence of free expression. Id. at 129-31. In this
respect, Justice Stone's implication that, by 1938, there were inverse standards of
review for economic liberty and freedom of expression was misleading.
14Id. at 131; see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927)

(Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance of freedom of expression in a
constitutional democracy).
'1 Compare New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), with Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375,377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
106See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) (ruling
that a Missouri administrative process to collect taxes violated due process); Dorchy
v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289 (1924) (invalidating the application of the compulsory

arbitration provision of the Kansas Industrial Relations Act to the coal mining
industry); Dawson v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288 (1921)
(invalidating a Kentucky whiskey tax as an unequal property tax in violation of the
state's constitutional requirement of uniform property taxes); Okla. Gin Co. v.
Oklahoma, 252 U.S. 339 (1920) (finding that rate-fixing orders of the Oklahoma
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This point, however, should not detract from the considerable
merits of White's criticisms of the tendency of conventional constitutional history, to perpetuate, to one extent or another, the notion
of a chronologically precise inverse relationship between the rise of
heightened judicial review concerning non-economic rights and the
demise of close scrutiny in the context of economic liberty. In its
place, he offers a modified jurisprudential narrative that more accurately emphasizes the evolutionary process of constitutional
interpretation and demonstrates some of the pitfalls of historical
determinism he essentially attributes to misconceptions fostered, in
large part, by Justice Stone's fabled footnote. Through careful
analysis of Court precedent and selective discussion of academic
commentary, White asserts that the emergence of free speech as a
compelling rationale for judicial intervention resulted from three
phases of development in constitutional thought.
Initially, the Court perceived rights of expression as complementary aspects of economic liberty protected by the Due Process
Clauses." When confronted in the decade after the First World
Corporation Commission violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because they did not provide adequate judicial review of administrative
decisions); Okla. Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920) (same).
,oIndeed, the doctrine of liberty of contract, often invoked in late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century economic due process cases, reflected a broad conception of
liberty. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 87-89, 93, 101-11
(1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause protected the freedom of individuals to pursue lawful occupations and
that such freedom emanated from the pursuit of personal happiness at the heart of
constitutional liberty); id. at 116-22 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (same); see also
Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City LiveStock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (explaining that liberty meant more than freedom from physical
constraint, it also signified "[t]he right to follow any of the common occupations"). In
Allgeyer v. Louisiana,165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Supreme Court formally recognized
liberty of contract as part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thereafter, liberty of contract enjoyed preeminent
constitutional status until the 1930s. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). As a constitutional doctrine, liberty of contrdct encompassed both tangible
and intangible property rights. Its emphasis upon preserving the pursuit of property
through a lawful occupation-itself an intangible property right-anticipated the
Court's eventual recognition that the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
also protected individuals' other intangible rights such as freedom of expression from
interference by the states. Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431,446-58 (1926).
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War by a series of cases that raised First Amendment issues about
the validity of public regulation of speech and press activities
deemed subversive, the Court invoked its traditional jurisprudence
of police powers to assess the constitutional limitations of such restrictions. As a result, most of the Justices employed the "bad
tendency" test to distinguish constitutionally protected expression
from communication considered detrimental to the security of a
democratic republic.1" Justice Holmes, however, criticized this
standard as intolerant and unduly repressive. For Justice Holmes,
the "free trade in ideas" signified an important means of promoting truth within a constitutional democracy." Accordingly, he
believed that only expression that presented "a clear and present

In 1925, the Supreme Court ruled the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the First Amendment Free Speech and Free Press Clauses.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Gitlow, Justice Edward Sanford,
commented that "we ...assume that freedom of speech and of the press-which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States." Id. at 666. Gitlow's recognition of freedom of
expression as part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment reflected the burgeoning recognition of several members of
the Court that liberty encompassed a broad spectrum of personal rights aside from
freedom of contract. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (deciding,
seven days before Gitlow, that the concept of Fourteenth Amendment liberty
included the freedom of parents and guardians to make educational decisions for
their children); Meyer v. Nebraska 268 U.S. 652 (1923) (ruling that Fourteenth
Amendment liberty protected the acquisition of foreign languages); Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (suggesting that, like
freedom of contract, the freedom to teach others about pacificism, fell within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (suggesting in dicta that the liberty preserved by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from state incursion included
some rights enumerated in the first eight amendments); see also Berea Coll. v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the right to
teach not only involved liberty of contract but also a fundamental liberty protected
from state infringement by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting "that
the privileges of free speech and of a free press ...constitute essential parts of every
man's liberty, and are protected against violation by that clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbidding a State to deprive any person of his liberty without due
process of law").
11See, e.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 652 (upholding seditious speech conviction).
't ' See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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danger" warranted limitation."' Similarly, Harvard Law School
professor Zechariah Chafee articulated the need for enhanced judicial protection of speech to encourage discussion of civic affairs
and other matters of public interest."'
From White's viewpoint, Justice Holmes's and Professor
Chafee's criticisms and their predominant concern with free speech
as a metaphor for democratic truth represented an early step in the
separation of freedom of expression from economic liberty and orthodox notions of police powers."' Yet White is also careful to note
that Justice Holmes's "clear and present danger" test, while theoretically more protective of speech, nevertheless proved as inept as
3
its predecessor in distinguishing good speech from bad." Inherently skeptical about the democratic process, Justice Holmes,
White argues, advocated the unfettered exchange of ideas, including unpopular ones, to foster the primacy of information over
political expediency."' Rather than a radical reconfiguration of
constitutional jurisprudence, the "clear and present danger" test
represented a modification of guardian review intended to preserve the boundaries between permissible governmental authority
and private activity."' Explaining both the "bad tendency" and
"clear and present danger" First Amendment standards as manifestations of the Court's traditional jurisprudence of police powers
not only underscores the limitations of both tests but also provides
a feasible explanation for the essentially cautious pattern of First
Amendment decisions rendered by the Court during the 1920s.

See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (ruling that the
110
distribution of pamphlets urging men not to comply with the World War I draft
constituted a clear and present danger).
I See generally Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech (1920) (discussing the

importance of freedom of expression in a constitutional democracy).
112 White, supra note 1, at 137-38.
113Id. at 138.
Id. at 137; see also White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, supra note 24, at 41254 (discussing Justice Holmes's free speech jurisprudence). Influenced in part by the
Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest, Justice Holmes believed that society
114

ultimately benefited from competition between ideas. Id. at 291, 324, 360; see, e.g.,
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that "the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market").
11sWhite, supra note 1, at 138.
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White gives much of the credit for enhanced judicial protection
of speech to Justice Holmes's younger counterpart on the Supreme
Court, Justice Louis D. Brandeis, whose seminal 1927 concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California116expressly linked freedom of expression to civic action. Extolling the virtue of speech as a
safeguard against the tyranny of democratic majorities, Brandeis
believed that one of the best ways to prevent arbitrary governmental authority was through the dissemination of ideas. 7 Freedom of
speech, therefore, was not only a fundamental right explicitly protected by the First Amendment, but also a democratic rite. Noting
that Justice Brandeis's justification for heightened judicial review
of speech-restrictive laws exceeded those proffered by Justice
Holmes and Professor Chafee, White identifies Justice Brandeis's
Whitney remarks as the catalyst for the eventual separation of free
speech from economic liberty in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence and the distinction that later emerged between close
judicial scrutiny of First Amendment claims and minimal review of
economic regulations."8
Yet, in describing Justice Brandeis's critical role in the transition
toward bifurcated judicial review, White does not consider the
strong parallel in Justice Brandeis's thought between heightened
judicial review of free speech and press claims and less stringent

116
274 U.S. 357,372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
7In a famous passage, Justice Brandeis remarked:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was
to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary .... They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth... that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of
the American government .... Believing in the power of reason as applied
through
public
discussion,
they
eschewed
silence
coerced
by

law .... Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of government majorities, they
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed.

Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Later in his concurring opinion, Justice

Brandeis said: "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is

more speech, not enforced silence." Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
'11 White,

supra note 1, at 139-40.
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judicial examination of local police powers. Though Justice
Brandeis believed the Constitution afforded more explicit protection to expressive than economic rights, his deference to public
control of private economic affairs and concern for speech reflected a passion for democracy and respect for civic deliberation.
Rather than consider the contrasting standards of judicial review
he endorsed as wholly indicative of the comparative value of enumerated First Amendment rights and implied constitutional
concepts such as liberty of contract, Justice Brandeis may have understood that both operated to ensure democratic efficiency.
Indeed, the laboratories of democracy he invoked as a rationale for
19
'
judicial deference towards the exercise of local police powers
presupposed the existence of a robust discussion of public ideas.
Enhanced judicial protection of such speech, therefore, would increase the legitimacy of local governmental authority by
encouraging open discussion of public matters,120 thus reducing the
need for close judicial examination of many forms of public regulation that did not involve the First Amendment. Thus, it would
appear that it was Justice Brandeis's commitment to participatory
democracy that underlay his conception of judicial review.
Justice Brandeis also understood that the express constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression and the application of the First
Amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provided additional support for heightened judicial protection of speech. According to White, this notion
of incorporation, together with Justice Brandeis's conscious attempt to link expression to democratic citizenship, created by the
end of the 1930s a "growing jurisprudential momentum for speech
rights.. 2 ' Indeed, during the 1930s, the Court applied the more
speech-protective "clear and present danger" test in subversive
speech cases rather than the "bad tendency" rule in vogue the pre-

See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis,
,19
J., dissenting). "There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould,

through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing
social and economic needs." Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
,20
121

White, supra note 1, at 143.
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vious decade,m and even invalidated a municipal ordinance intended to suppress the publication of stories presumed to
constitute a nuisance. 13
Rather than attribute these decisions to abrupt doctrinal changes
resulting from the external pressures of New Deal politics, White
emphasizes that the ultimate adoption of bifurcated judicial review
only occurred after the Court more explicitly set forth the connection between the preferred constitutional status of First
Amendment rights and democracy. This happened in a series of
cases throughout the late 1930s and into the 1940s in which the Justices debated the nature of selective incorporation and, more
overtly than had Justices Brandeis and Holmes before them, linked
freedom of expression to democratic values." In so doing, they relied extensively upon the explicit constitutional textual protection
afforded to First Amendment rights. Consequently, the importance
of non-fundamental constitutional rights such as economic liberty
subsided, and by mid-century the present model of bifurcated judicial review was in place with its essential dichotomy between
economic liberty and freedom of expression."
Though White undoubtedly succeeds in demonstrating the virtual irrelevance of New Deal events in the transformation of First
Amendment jurisprudence, two Supreme Court cases from the late
1930s suggest that, for some of the Justices, the theoretical separation of economic liberty from freedom of expression began earlier
than White indicates. In Grosjean v. American Press Co.,12 a
' See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (invalidating the conviction of a

Communist party organizer under a Georgia law proscribing the incitement to

insurrection as an unconstitutional infringement of free speech).
1
2 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (finding a Minnesota "gag" law

an unconstitutional prior restraint).

124See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (prohibiting
compulsory flag salute in public schools); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27
(1937) (suggesting that the First Amendment is at the heart of other constitutional
freedoms).
'2- Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (applying the
rational basis test to a local economic regulation), with Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639
(applying heightened scrutiny to compelled speech). For a more recent example of
this dichotomy between economic liberty and freedom of expression, see Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding a federal marketing
order compelling the monetary contributions of fruit farmers as an incidental
restriction upon their free speech rights).
12297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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unanimous Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana license tax on
the gross advertising receipts of the state's largest newspapers. Justice Sutherland, who wrote the opinion of the Court, reasoned that
the tax, which exempted periodicals of relatively small circulation,
discriminated against larger segments of the Louisiana press in
contravention of the First Amendment." Having ostensibly decided the case on First Amendment grounds, Justice Sutherland
presumably found it unnecessary to reach the equal protection issue also presented before the Court." Yet the opinion Justice
Sutherland published was quite different from the one he circulated in draft form to the Justices. Indeed, within this draft, Justice
Sutherland, who essentially believed the differential license tax
abridged the economic liberty of large volume newspaper publishers, eschewed the First Amendment and instead based his entire
decision upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'2 9
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, however, refused to join Justice
Sutherland's proposed opinion. Though willing to sustain the authority of Louisiana to enact a differential license tax as a revenue
measure, Justice Cardozo worried that the unequal operation of
the law abridged the First Amendment interests of the state's largest newspapers and thus impinged upon the dissemination of ideas.
Accordingly, he drafted a concurring opinion in which he asserted
that the license tax violated freedom of the press." Justice Cardozo
See id. at 244-45,250-51.
See id. at 251.
Richard C. Cortner, The Kingfish and the Constitution 165 (1996); Andrew L.
-29
Kaufman, Cardozo 539-41 (1998); see Samuel R. Olken, The Business of Expression:
Economic Liberty, Political Factions and the Forgotten First Amendment Legacy of
Justice George Sutherland, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. (forthcoming 2002)

(manuscript at 61-62, 70) (on file with author).
130Kaufman,

supra note 129, at 539-41; see Benjamin Cardozo, Draft of Grosjean

Concurring Opinion (1936) (transcription available in Cardozo Papers in the Special

Kaufman Cardozo Collection of Harvard Law School Library [hereinafter Cardozo,
Grosjean Draft Concurrence]. In his unpublished concurring opinion, Justice Cardozo
explained the Equal Protection Clause permitted the state to impose a tax of general

applicability on the business operations of newspapers. Moreover, he asserted that

states could impose progressive taxes on some businesses and not others if the
distinctions emanated from reasonable differences, and the taxes reflected the

exercise of legitimate police powers. Id. at 5, 8-10. Instead, Justice Cardozo thought

the license tax infringed upon the First Amendment interests of Louisiana's largest
newspapers. Id. at 1-4 (equating the Louisiana license tax with Great Britain's
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withdrew this concurring opinion only after Justice Sutherland and
the other members of the Court agreed to adopt his First Amendment analysis as the basis of the decision."' Presumably, Justices
Brandeis, Stone, and Owen Roberts, each of whom had previously
expressed considerable deference toward the exercise of local
powers of taxation," viewed the case from Justice Cardozo's perspective, whereas Justice Sutherland and at least three other
Justices probably regarded the dispute as one primarily involving
economic liberty.'33 Aside from underscoring disagreement within
the Court over the constitutional limits of economic regulation, the
existence of Justice Cardozo's unpublished concurring opinion
would seem to suggest that by the late 1930s some members of the
Court had already severed economic claims from First Amendment ones in their evolving constitutional jurisprudence.
Similarly divergent perspectives surfaced in Associated Press v.
NLRB," when by a margin of a single vote the Supreme Court upheld the application of the National Labor Relations Act to the
editorial department of a private news agency that had dismissed
one of its editors, a prominent union leader. In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Roberts characterized the federal labor law as a legitimate economic regulation of incidental effect upon the First
discredited attempts, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to tax
knowledge and limit the circulation of information). "Once admit the possibility of
imposing upon the press a special system of taxation, and its freedom is a myth,
except indeed by dint of governmental grace." Id. at 5; see id. at 5, 10. Professor
Andrew Kaufman, of Harvard Law School, generously made available a copy of his

transcription of this unpublished draft.
mCortner, supra note 129, at 165; Kaufman, supra note 129, at 540-41.

See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550,566-80 (1935) (Cardozo,
J., dissenting) (supporting the principle of graduated taxes for chain stores); Liggett

Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545-47, 568-76 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing a
Florida license tax on chain stores was a reasonable means of promoting public
welfare). Justice Stone joined in both these dissenting opinions. See also Olken, supra
note 129, at 62-66 (noting the Justices' relaxed standard of review in these cases). For
Justice Roberts's views, see Great Atl. & Pac. Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937)

(Roberts, J.) (sustaining Louisiana's progressive taxation of chain stores); State Bd. of
Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931) (Roberts, J.) (upholding the application

of an Indiana graduated license tax to chain stores). But see Liggett, 288 U.S. at 518

(Roberts, J.) (asserting that a Florida progressive tax that imposed a larger burden on
the common owner of chain stores within different counties of the state than on

proprietors with multiple stores in a single county violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
33

Olken, supra note 129, at 61.
301 U.S. 103 (1937).
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Amendment rights of the news agency."' Conversely, Justice Sutherland, this time writing in dissent, asserted that the act infringed
upon the editorial autonomy of the press and thus violated the
First Amendment.'36 As in Grosjean, this striking contrast in jurisprudential emphasis, at the very least, indicates a growing
divergence between economic liberty and freedom of expression.
Nevertheless, as White explains with much precision and to considerable effect, the transformation in First Amendment
jurisprudence was not complete until the Court consistently articulated enhanced protection for freedom of expression based upon
the preferred constitutional position of such rights. Widespread
application of selective incorporation theory to judicial review of
free speech and press claims after the New Deal ultimately brought
to fruition the ideal of democratic participation integral to modem
First Amendment theory.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL
CONTEXT

At the heart of White's book is the premise that changes in constitutional interpretation reflected the ascendant influence of
modernity upon legal culture. With its emphasis upon human causation and rejection of passive behavior, modernism pervaded
American intellectual thought during the early decades of the
twentieth century. 37 Modernist faith in the power of individuals to
alter society and effect reform impelled members of the legal profession to reconsider the relationship between sources of the law
and the authority of legal interpreters. Consequently, a gradual
Id. at 132-33.

135

at 134-41 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); see also Olken, supra note 129, at 46-48,
83-109 (discussing Associated Press as evidence of the burgeoning dichotomy in
constitutional jurisprudence between economic liberty and freedom of expression).
137 White, supra note 1, at 5-6. White employs "the term modernity ... to mean the
actual world brought about by a combination of advanced industrial capitalism,
increased participatory democracy, the weakening of a hierarchical class-based social
order, and the emergence of science as an authoritative method of intellectual
inquiry." Id. at 5. White uses the terms modernity and modernism interchangeably, as
in "modernist consciousness" and the judicial attitude of modernism. Id.; see also
Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of
Legal Orthodoxy 6, 169-212 (1992) (discussing the influence of modernism in the
evolution of legal realism during the 1930s).
16 Id.
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transformation occurred in which a more instrumental conception
of law, based upon legal realism, supplanted legal formalism and its
orthodox application of static legal principles. White argues that
the early twentieth-century conflict among common law scholars
over the nature and legitimacy of legal authority eventually informed public law debate over the extent to which jurists could
adapt the Constitution to changing conditions within a democratic
republic. By linking these jurisprudential crises of private and public law, White provides an essential perspective from which to
understand the intellectual context in which the Supreme Court
transformed its constitutional jurisprudence during the 1930s and
1940s.
A. The JurisprudentialConflict Between Legal Formalism and
Realism
As a prelude to his analysis of the crisis of constitutional adaptivity, White devotes a critical chapter to discussion of the
comprehensive efforts of elite legal scholars to restate common law
principles. Initiated in the 1920s under the auspices of the American Law Institute, the Restatement projects intended to correct
problems in the traditional classification of legal doctrine exacerbated by the proliferation of judicial decisions at the outset of the
twentieth century. A plethora of cases spawned a contradictory
and confusing corpus of legal authority whose very complexity
threatened the sanctity of an hierarchical, essentially taxonomic,
system of classification devised during the late nineteenth century
by Christopher Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School and the
leading proponent of the notion that law was a science comprised
of fundamental rules primarily accessible to those specially trained
in the common law tradition."3 White identifies Langdell and his
disciples as legal formalists who steadfastly distinguished between
the authority of legal sources, which they regarded as a set of unchanging, essential legal principles, and the authority of legal
interpreters.139 Confronted with widespread uncertainty about substantive aspects of the law by the third decade of the twentieth
century, many prominent attorneys and law professors sought to
L3
White, Tort Law in America, supra note 24, at xvii-xviii, 26-34,37-39,56,155.
39 White, supra note 1, at 167-68,174-75.
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clarify common law doctrine through improved methods of classification. Yet, as White explains, because the initial Restatement
format merely refined Langdellian epistemology and left intact its
conceptual distinction between legal sources and their interpreters,
the draft restatements proved similarly inept at describing legal
doctrine." Bereft of uniform definitions and consistent standards,
the early Restatements of law demonstrated the practical limits of
legal formalism.
Essentially, White views the impetus for the Restatement projects and the subsequent criticism lodged against them by legal
realists as evidence of a brewing jurisprudential crisis over the nature and legitimacy of legal authority in the early decades of the
twentieth century. In contrast to the formalists who drafted the
first Restatements were legal realists such as Professors Jerome
Frank and Thurman Arnold for whom law comprised "the aggregate of legal decisions made by human officials in a changing social
context.''41 Insofar as they rejected the dichotomy between legal
sources and their interpreters that underlay legal formalism, legal
realists emphasized the behavioral aspects of judicial review.'42
Theirs was an instrumental conception of law in which factual circumstances rather than abstract theories guided the application of
legal principles. Critical of the Restatement projects as naYve efforts to recast legal doctrine in terms that presupposed the
existence of eternal and unchanging rules, legal realists preferred
to examine the variants of judicial interpretation through the perspective of social context."' Shrewdly, White notes that although
the legal realists were unable to formulate concrete alternatives to
the Restatements of law, their behavioral criticisms of the Restatement methodology underscored the underlying conflict about
the nature of judicial decisionmaking.'"
178-81.
189.
Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American
Justice (1949) (expressing skepticism about the sanctity of judge-made law)
[hereinafter, Frank, Courts on Trial]; Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind
(1930) (criticizing formal legal analysis from the perspective of legal realism). Frank
explained that "legal rules are judge-made and therefore frequently mutable." Frank,
140
White, supra note 1, at
11 White, supra note 1, at
See generally Jerome
142

Courts on Trial, supra, at 316.

White,
143

supra note 1, at 189-91.

I" Id. at 193-96.
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For White, the advent of modernity shaped the parameters of a
jurisprudential crisis years before the New Deal. Disagreement
over the continued validity of the distinction between sources of
the law and legal interpretation reflected the contradictory strands
of legal analysis that emerged in bold relief as the field of law
struggled to adapt its mechanisms to modem conditions. In its evolution from an academic to a legal debate, the crisis revealed
internal schisms over the legitimacy of legal authority and the nature of judicial review. Ultimately, the realist's critique of the
Restatement projects pierced the veneer of formalism and introduced an instrumental conception of law. White's subtle account of
the Restatement controversy is important because it demonstrates
the ideological backdrop against which the transformation in constitutional jurisprudence occurred during the 1930s and 1940s.
B. PoliticalEconomy and the Crisis of ConstitutionalAdaptivity
Between the 1920s and 1940s, the Supreme Court significantly
altered its constitutional jurisprudence of political economy.
Though conventional historiography attributes much of the doctrinal shift in economic liberty cases to the influence of the New
Deal and the external pressures it placed on the Court,4 5 in recent
years revised analysis of the Court's due process, police powers,
and Commerce Clause decisions from this era reveals the historical
irrelevance of the Court-packing plan and New Deal politics as
catalysts of change. 6 In part, drawing upon the work of his colleague at Virginia, Barry Cushman, White emphasizes the
evolutionary process in which the Court departed from the jurisprudential framework of guardian review in its application of
constitutional provisions to problems of political economy.
Rather than examine the doctrinal origins of this constitutional
development, White analyzes its ideological structure. He considers the conflict within the Court over constitutional adjudication as
part of a larger debate about the nature of legal authority and judi1' See, e.g., 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 279-368 (1998)

(linking the shift in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence of political economy to
the Court-packing plan and the external pressures of New Deal politics); McCloskey,
supra note 6, at 117-20.
141See generally Cushman, supra note 21, (discussing doctrinal changes in early
twentieth-century constitutional law).
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cial review that fueled the controversy over the Restatement projects. Growing recognition by some of the Justices about the
untenable distinction between the authority of legal sources and
their interpreters coincided with changing social and economic
conditions that altered perceptions about the role of government in
private economic affairs. Accordingly, White concludes that during
the 1930s, and into the next decade, "an interpretive revolution"
occurred, precipitated by "a crisis in the meaning of constitutional
adaptivity."14 7
Divergent views of constitutional interpretation enhanced the
poignancy of this crisis. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, an orthodox
conception of judicial review dominated public law. Most Supreme
Court Justices during this period, to one extent or another, regarded the Constitution as an edifice comprised of essential
principles of fixed meaning.' Guardian review, therefore, required
strict construction of constitutional provisions in order to protect
individual liberty from the tyranny of democratic majorities.149
White's use of this term is a particularly apt description of orthodox constitutional adjudication. Proponents of guardian review
supra note 1, at 204.
e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 403 (1937) (Sutherland,
J., dissenting). Ten years before he joined the Court, then-Senator Sutherland
explained that "[a] written constitution means nothing unless it means stability and
permanency" and analogized the Constitution to the foundation of a building. 47
Cong. Rec. 2793,2794 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland).
149
See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-53 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (asserting that the meaning of the Contract Clause and
other constitutional limitations remains constant in order to preserve individual rights
from the vagaries of democratic majorities). In 1913, in the context of criticizing a
proposal for the recall of unpopular judicial opinions, then-Senator George
Sutherland articulated the essence of guardian review:
The demand for the recall of judicial decisions proceeds upon a theory which
completely disregards the nature of the judicial function, which is not to register
the changing opinions of the majority as to what the Constitution and law ought
to be, but to interpret and declare the Constitution and law as they are, whether
such interpretation satisfies the desires of many or of none at all.
George Sutherland, The Law and the People, Address Before the Pennsylvania
Society 5 (Dec. 13, 1913) (N.Y., N.Y.) (transcript available in the Sutherland Papers
at the Library of Congress), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 328 (1913). Elsewhere,
Sutherland explained that "[t]he written constitution is the shelter and the bulwark of
what might otherwise be a helpless minority." 47 Cong. Rec. 2793, 2800 (1911)
(statement of Sen. Sutherland).
147White,

1

18See,
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were devoted to the equal operation of the law and inherently
skeptical of class legislation enacted at the behest of political factions that imposed differential economic burdens.5 ' Ever vigilant in
differentiating between public and private rights, they employed a
largely inflexible categorical jurisprudence of police powers to assess the limits of public regulation of private economic affairs.
Pursuant to this approach, they invalidated laws that bore only a
tenuous relationship to the public welfare."'
Jurists who believed a formal distinction existed between the
sources of law and its interpreters, however, often found it necessary to create judicial glosses of open-ended constitutional
provisions in order to implement aspects of guardian review. Frequent invocation of liberty of contract, a substantive doctrine
derived from a broad construction of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,"52 exemplified the extent to which
many Justices sought to apply traditional constitutional limitations
to changing circumstances. 53 The irony of this approach, however,
did not escape some members of the Court, such as Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, who considered the indiscriminate use of liberty
of contract and other judicial glosses detrimental to the legitimacy
of guardian review in a constitutional democracy. In particular,
Justice Holmes worried that judicial reliance upon such vague concepts in determining the scope of governmental authority fostered

- See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a

minimum wage law for women as illegitimate class legislation).
-' Olken, supra note 10, at 26-29. In a classic expression of the connection between
guardian review and late nineteenth-century police powers jurisprudence, Justice

Stephen Field remarked:
If the courts could not... examine... the real character of the act, but must

accept the declaration of the legislature as conclusive, the most valued rights of
the citizen would be subject to the arbitrary control of a temporary
majority ... instead of being protected by the guarantees of the Constitution.
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 696-97 (1888) (Field, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1873) (Bradley,

J., dissenting) ("This right to choose one's calling is an essential part of that liberty
which it is the object of government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man's
property and right. Liberty and property are not protected where these rights are
arbitrarily assailed."); see also id. at 83-111 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing a butcher's

monopoly infringed upon liberty of contract in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
'-9See

White, supra note 1, at 217.
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a perception that the Justices advanced their personal socioeconomic theories through the guise of constitutional interpretation."
Though, as White explains, Justice Holmes never abandoned
guardian review, " his observation about its potential for subjective
application of constitutional principles anticipated criticism of the
Court's "mechanical" jurisprudence of police powers." Increasingly, commentators perceived adjudication as a behavioralist
enterprise in which human beings made policy judgments in the
application of legal precedent. Consequently, they questioned the
traditional dichotomy between the sources of law and its interpreters integral to guardian review. Within this intellectual context
emerged what White calls "the living Constitution" theory.1 Ini154See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Lochner, Justice Holmes
commented that:
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of
laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes asserted that the Lochner
majority based its decision "upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain" and that "[t]he Fourteen[th] Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, supra note 24, at 326-28 (discussing Holmes's
view of liberty of contract).
'5 White, supra note 1, at 221-22. In this regard, White's suggestion that Justice
Holmes continued to subscribe to guardian review, despite his misgivings about it, in
and of itself constitutes an important contribution to understanding Justice Holmes's
role in the early twentieth-century constitutional transformation.
See, e.g., Pound, supra note 36. Curiously, White omits much discussion of
sociological jurisprudence and its connection to legal realism. Sociological
jurisprudents such as Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School during the first decade of
the twentieth century, were the first group of legal scholars to employ in their analysis
of legal issues sociological principles and those from other social science disciplines.
This interdisciplinary approach led to the inclusion of economic and sociological data
in legal arguments. With its emphasis upon the contextual analysis of legal issues,
sociological jurisprudence in many ways anticipated legal realism. See White, Tort
Law in America, supra note 24, at 69-71, 74, 79, 82; see also Adkins, 261 U.S. at 52635 (Appellant's Brief by Felix Frankfurter and Francis H. Stephens) (prime example
of a legal brief whose inclusion of sociological and economic data bore the influence
of sociological jurisprudence); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (Appellant's
Brief by Louis D. Brandeis) (same).
17 White, supra note 1, at 221, 225-26, 233-34, 299, 356-57 n.25. For a study of the
origins of the phrase "living Constitution," see Howard Gillman, The Collapse of
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tially expressed in the late 1920s, this flexible mode of constitutional interpretation gained considerable momentum throughout
the 1930s as the Supreme Court struggled to reconcile orthodox
notions of judicial review with legal issues of political economy
arising from the Depression. In contrast to guardian review, the living Constitution theory regarded constitutional adaptivity as "a
process in which human interpreters altered the meaning of the
Constitution to make it responsive to changed social conditions."158
Eventually, this instrumental view of constitutional adjudication
supplanted the more anachronistic model of guardian review, yet
as White demonstrates throughout his book, neither the New Deal
nor the Court-packing plan precipitated this interpretive transition.
From this perspective, White analyzes the pattern of change in the
Court's jurisprudence of political economy as part of a gradual
transformation in constitutional interpretation and thus refutes its
common portrayal in conventional narratives of this period. Accordingly, White discusses at length three seminal decisions, each
of which, to one extent or another, illustrates salient points of his
thesis about evolving notions of constitutional adpativity and political economy.
1. The Contract Clause and ConstitutionalAdaptivity
Of the trio, perhaps the most intriguing is the Minnesota mortgage moratorium case. In Home Building & Loan Association v.
59 a sharply divided Court upheld a law that extended
Blaisdell,'
temporarily the period in which a mortgagor could redeem foreclosed property. In sustaining the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Act"6 as a reasonable exercise of police powers during
an economic emergency,"' Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes,
writing for the majority, reasoned that the parties executed their
mortgage contract subject to the state's authority to preserve the
economic welfare of its citizens. 62 Rather than interpret literally
the Contract Clause prohibition of state laws that impair the obliConstitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitution" in
the Course of American State-Building, 11 Stud. Am. Pol.Dev. 191 (1997).
I.q
Id. at 210.
U59
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
"wCh. 339,1933 Minn. Laws 514.
16
, Blaisdell,290 U.S. at 444-47.
'2Id. at 443-44.
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gation of contracts, Chief Justice Hughes balanced the public interest in general economic welfare with private contract rights63
and ruled the mortgage moratorium only affected the mortgagee's
contract remedy."
In dissent, Justice Sutherland argued that the Minnesota statute
was no different in effect from the post-Revolutionary war debtor
relief legislation that modified contractual obligations and undermined the security of contract rights in the early republic. 65 Critical
of Chief Justice Hughes's pragmatic analysis of a seemingly unambiguous constitutional provision, Justice Sutherland, though
sympathetic to the plight of Depression-era mortgagors, steadfastly
adhered to a strict construction of the Contract Clause and asserted that it did "not mean one thing at one time and an entirely
different thing at another time."'" Eschewing the constitutional
relativism of those Justices in the majority, Justice Sutherland and
his fellow dissenters instead invoked what they perceived were
fundamental and unalterable constitutional principles intended to
preserve the sanctity of private contract obligations from the tyranny of ephemeral democratic majorities. 67 As such, the dissent
illustrated the orthodox model of guardian review that White carefully reconstructs throughout his book.
Though the opinions of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Sutherland undoubtedly exemplify the crisis of constitutional adaptivity
that confronted the Supreme Court during the 1930s, the Blaisdell
decision itself represented less of a departure from traditional Con-

'-Id. at 434-35, 437, 442. To this extent, Chief Justice Hughes explained: "The
policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a

government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while,--a government
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society." Id.
at 435.
I",
Id. at 425, 445-47.
165Id. at 453-65 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). As Justice Sutherland explained, the

"Constitution... was meant to foreclose state action impairing the obligation of
contracts primarily and especially in respect of such action aimed at giving relief to

debtors in time of emergency." Id. at 465 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 449 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
at 451-53 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justice Sutherland warned that "[i]f the
provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they
comfort, they may as well be abandoned." Id. at 483 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
1,67
Id.
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tract Clause jurisprudence than White indicates." In many respects, the Court's opinion was a fairly narrow one, which
notwithstanding the Chief Justice's conscious effort to apply the
"living Constitution" theory to the changing economic conditions
of Depression-era Minnesota, 9 nevertheless rested on precedent
and the particular facts before the Court.'
From this perspective, White may place undue emphasis upon
those portions of the opinion in which "Hughes borrowed from
due process analysis."' 7 ' One conclusion drawn from White's observation is that the Chief Justice essentially read into the Contract
Clause an implicit limitation of its scope based upon the residual
authority of the states to regulate private economic affairs pursuant
to the legitimate exercise of local police powers." While this is cer"6 Samuel R. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical
Study of Contract Clause Jurisprudence, 72 Or. L. Rev. 513, 515-16, 522, 551-52, 568,
599-602 (1993).
'- Blaisdell,290 U.S. at 426, 428, 435, 437-40, 442-44. Quite understandably, White
reaches the conclusion that Chief Justice Hughes applied "living Constitution" theory
in Blaisdell given the Chief Justice's repeated references to "a growing recognition of
public needs." Id. at 442-43. Chief Justice Hughes also perceived:
the necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual
rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of the
public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing density of population, the
interrelation of the activities of our people and the complexity of our economic
interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the organization of society
in order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity.... [T]he question
is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the
use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the
good of all depends.
Id. at 442.
For the extent to which this passage and other aspects of Chief Justice Hughes's
opinion reflected the ideas of Justices Cardozo and Stone, see Olken, supra note 168,
at 584-86, 589-91 (discussing their unpublished concurring opinions and memoranda
about the case); White, supra note 1, at 211-15 (analyzing Chief Justice Hughes's
Blaisdell opinion).
170
The decision's emphasis upon the reasonableness of the mortgage moratorium
derived from the temporary modification of the contract remedy and the mortgagee's
continual payment of rent during the extension of the redemption period. The statute
did not abrogate the mortgage contract; it only altered the foreclosure remedy
pursuant to which the mortgagee could obtain relief arising from the mortgagors's
default. See Blaisdell,290 U.S. at 425, 445-48.
7,White, supra note 1, at 212.
172 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434-35, 437, 442-44. Chief Justice Hughes said: "The
reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordinary conditions may be
deemed to be as much a part of all contracts, as is the reservation of state power to
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tainly true, White's implication that Chief Justice Hughes crafted a
revolutionary opinion is somewhat misleading and does not appear
to take into account either the pattern of Contract Clause jurisprudence that preceded this case nor Chief Justice Hughes's own
inherent reluctance to break from precedent.
Indeed, throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth
centuries, most Supreme Court Justices refrained from construing
the Contract Clause as an absolute bar to public regulation of contract rights. Instead, the Court increasingly interpreted the
meaning of the Contract Clause in an instrumental sense, cognizant
of both the practical allocation of governmental authority within a
federal system and the interplay between economic development
and the security of contract interests.173 During the initial phase of
Contract Clause jurisprudence, members of the Court differentiated between the constitutional protection of vested contract rights
and the permissible authority of states to modify contractual remedies. Pursuant to this distinction between contract rights and
remedies, the Court set forth early inroads upon the scope of the
Contract Clause. 4
By mid-nineteenth century, the Justices often invoked the doctrine of reserved state powers in their analysis of Contract Clause
issues. Intended to reconcile public control over economic devel" Id. at 439. Chief Justice Hughes also noted that the
protect the public interest ....
"principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum

of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court." Id. at
435.
17 Olken, supra note 168, at 522-52.
174
See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (upholding a New
York law that provided prospective relief for debtors as one that merely affected
contract remedies); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823) (ruling that the
Kentucky Occupying Claimants Laws unconstitutionally abridged contract rights);

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (finding that a
state's revocation of a charter impaired vested contract rights in violation of the
Contract Clause); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819)
(invalidating an insolvency statute that retroactively excused the payment of an
antecedent debt); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invoking the
Contract Clause to invalidate legislative revocation of a land grant); see also Olken,
supra note 168, at 522-36 (discussing the rights-remedies distinction in early
nineteenth-century Contract Clause jurisprudence).
115
See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 675 (Story, J., concurring)
(explaining that a state could not retroactively divest or otherwise interfere with the
contract rights of a corporation in the absence of the state's reservation of such power
in the act of incorporation). Interestingly, White notes this development in his
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opment fostered by state charters of corporations and other forms
of commercial enterprise,1 76 this principle recognized the
authority
of local government to retain such powers as taxation "
nent domain" in contracts executed between the state andand emiprivate
persons. Though limited to public contracts, this doctrine
eventually spawned a more pervasive and broad qualification
of the
Contract Clause prevalent throughout the remainder
of the nineteenth century and into the next one.
Confronted by a number of cases in which states sought
late both public and private contractual agreements for to regureasons of
public health, safety, morals, or welfare, the Supreme Court
began
to apply the concept of inalienable police powers in its
analysis of
Contract Clause disputes. Initially, the Court ruled
that states
could not relinquish their authority to prescribe police power
regulations to promote public health, safety, morals, or
welfare in
public grants of corporate franchises to private citizensY9
Thereafter, it also applied this doctrine in ways that implicitly balanced
the
legitimate exercise of state police powers with the security
of
private rights."S In a few cases, the Court included
economic
prosperity within the purview of public welfare 81 and sustained
loanalysis of Justice Story's concurring opinion. White, The
24, at 660-62; see also Olken, supra note 168, at 536-41 Marshall Court, supra note
(discussing the doctrine of
reserved state powers as a limitation upon the scope of
the Contract Clause).
176
See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)
(narrowly construing a corporate charter and refusing
to find an implied reservation
of state powers).
'" See, e.g., Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.)
514 (1830) (noting that the
absence of express immunity from taxation in a corporate
charter would render a
bank subject to taxation by the state).
'7 See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.)
507 (1848) (upholding a
state's reserved power of eminent domain).
M"
See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880)
(permitting a state to
proscribe a lottery pursuant to its inalienable police powers).
1w See, e.g., Union Dry Goods Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv.
Corp., 248 U.S. 372, 374-75
(1919) (ruling that private utility contract rates were
subject to state police powers);
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355-57
(1908) (finding the public
interest in conservation outweighed private contract
rights); Manigault v. Springs, 199
U.S. 473, 480-81, 485-86 (1905) (noting the paramount
public interest in improving
swamp land over private contract rights); see also Olken,
supra note 168, at 542-52
(discussing the concept of inalienable police powers).
"ISee, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Ill.
Drainage Comm'r, 200 U.S.
561 (1906) (finding the promotion of economic prosperity
within the scope of
inalienable police powers).
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welfare concept rather than through a radical reconstruction of
Contract Clause principles."s
2. The Evolving Notion of JudicialDeference Throughoutthe 1930s
The second case White uses to illustrate the emergence of the
1"
"living Constitution theory" is West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
another decision in which a bare majority of the Court upheld a
Washington minimum wage law for women. Often cited as the case
that marked the Supreme Court's abrupt reversal of course in its
jurisprudence of political economy, White offers a revised interpretation of this decision consistent with his overall thesis that the
external pressures of New Deal politics were irrelevant in the
transformation of the Court's constitutional thought. White argues
that although the Court overruled Adkins v. Children'sHospital"
and questioned the primacy of liberty of contract,l" Chief Justice
Hughes, who once again wrote the majority opinion, never entirely
abandoned guardian review in his analysis of police powers. To this
extent, White explains that Chief Justice Hughes found the Adkins
precedent untenable because it failed to acknowledge the connection between improving women's wages and public welfare.
Accordingly, the Chief Justice's references to changing economic
conditions demonstrated his willingness to expand the concept of
public welfare, which White implies was not necessarily tantamount to rational basis judicial review."9 Thus, from White's
perspective, West Coast Hotel was a transitional case in the Court's
interpretive transformation rather than an example of modern
economic due process.
Although 1937, the year in which the Court decided West Coast
Hotel, did not mark the endpoint of the "revolution" in its constitutional jurisprudence of political economy, it nevertheless was a
pivotal point along the way. Yet, in some respects, White's conclusion that Chief Justice Hughes's opinion demonstrated the
'6Olken, supra note 168, at 515-16, 551-52, 577-602; see also Richard A.
Maidment, Chief Justice Hughes and the Contract Clause: A Re-assessment, 8 J.
Legal Hist. 316, 316-17, 324-25 (1987) (discussing the Blaisdell decision).
18 300 U.S. 379 (1937).

18261 U.S. 525 (1923).
1

18

See W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 390-92,397-400.
White, supra note 1, at 218-25.
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continued influence of guardian review obscures the extent to
which he and other members of the Court's emerging majority began to adopt a more deferential approach in their assessment of the
constitutional limits of public regulation of private economic affairs. Chief Justice Hughes's repeated references to the public
interest in private contracts and changing economic conditions..
evoked similar references he made three years earlier in Blaisdell
and reflected a growing reluctance among some of these Justices to
apply the rigid distinction between public and private economic interests characteristic of orthodox constitutionalism. In this sense,
then, the Chief Justice's willingness to accept the legitimacy of the
Washington state minimum wage law for women emanated from
Nebbia v. New York"n and other economic regulation cases from
the early 1930s that collapsed the formal distinction between private and public rights.193
It also revealed a subtle change in due process methodology that
had nothing to do with the Court-packing plan or New Deal reforms. Increased judicial deference to local economic regulation by
the end of the 1930s came about in large part through the persistent efforts of Justices Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone, each of whom
consistently expressed a notion of judicial review that emphasized
the importance of factual context and a practical understanding of
economic regulation. " For example, in a series of cases that involved state taxation of intrastate businesses, this trio, in contrast
to Justice Sutherland and other steadfast adherents of guardian review, preferred to use a test of reasonableness to ascertain the
constitutionality of license taxes. 95 Consequently, they balanced
191W.

CoastHotel Co., 300 U.S. at 390-92, 398-400.
291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding a New York regulation of milk prices).
193See, e.g., O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931)
(upholding state regulation of the insurance business).
19 See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 569-77 (1935) (Cardozo,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing judicial deference to local economic regulation); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(discussing the economic rationale for public regulation of the ice business) (Justice
Stone joined in the dissent).
195See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co., 294 U.S. at 566-77 (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(admonishing the Court for unduly restricting the discretion of the Kentucky
legislature in devising a progressive tax); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 294 U.S. 87,
97-102 (1935) (Cardozo, J.) (sustaining a West Virginia graduated tax on gas station
chains); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 543-47, 568-76 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
192
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the public interest in raising revenue with the conditional privilege
of doing business and frequently viewed such progressive, or
graduated, taxes as legitimate public regulation of private economic rights." Rather than insist that there be a close and
substantial relationship between the tax scheme and the public welfare," these Justices departed from the rigidly categorical
constitutional jurisprudence of guardian review and instead afforded the states broad discretion to regulate private commercial
enterprise through taxation.98 In so doing, their approach anticipated the shift throughout the latter half of the 1930s that occurred
in the Court's police powers jurisprudence.
Indeed, even though Chief Justice Hughes went to great lengths
in West Coast Hotel to justify the Washington minimum wage law
as a matter of public welfare, he actually expressed considerable

dissenting); id. at 580-86 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (both expressing deference toward
local economic regulation); see also Olken, supra note 129, at 62-68 (discussing the
conflicts within the Court's jurisprudence concerning the powers of state taxation).
96See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co., 294 U.S. at 566-77 (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(admonishing the Court for unduly restricting the discretion of the Kentucky
legislature in devising a progressive tax); Fox, 294 U.S. at 97-102 (1935) (Cardozo, J.)
(sustaining a West Virginia graduated tax on gas station chains); Liggett, 288 U.S.
at543-47, 568-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 580-86 (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(both expressing deference toward local economic regulation).
17 See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 430-34 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (finding arbitrary Louisiana's progressive chain store tax);
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422-25 (1935) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a
Vermont income tax exemption on in-state loans); Stewart Dry Goods Co., 294 U.S.
at 555-60 (Roberts, J.) (finding a Kentucky graduated retail sales tax
unconstitutionally arbitrary); Liggett, 288 U.S. at 533-35 (Roberts, J.) (invalidating a
progressive Florida chain store tax); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S.
527, 543-52 (1931) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (asserting that differences in tax
classification must reflect significant distinctions between businesses); Louisville Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-40 (1928) (Sutherland, J.) (invalidating a
Kentucky mortgage recording tax under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
19See, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509-12 (1937) (Stone,
J.) (finding that an Alabama unemployment compensation law distinguished between
employers on a rational basis); Grosjean,301 U.S. at 419-27 (Roberts, J.) (upholding
a Louisiana progressive tax on chain stores as a reasonable means of promoting
economic competition); Fox, 294 U.S. at 97-102 (Cardozo, J.); State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs, 283 U.S. at 535-37 (Roberts, J.) (upholding an Indiana graduated license
tax).
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deference to the state.1 While he may not have completely jettisoned guardian review, his recognition of the public interest in
private contracts and refusal to construe liberty of contract as an
absolute right suggests an inchoate attempt on his part to balance
public and private interests much like Justices Brandeis, Stone, and
Cardozo did in the state taxation cases of the period, whose significance constitutional historians often neglect.
3. The Relative Importance of 1937
In part, White asserts that the plethora of 5-4 decisions rendered
by the Supreme Court throughout the 1930s indicates the gradual
process by which the "living Constitution" theory supplanted
guardian review.' Yet despite its internal schism over the appropriate constitutional limits of economic regulation, the fact remains
that by the end of 1937 the Supreme Court had significantly turned
the comer in transforming its jurisprudence of political economy.
Not only had a slender majority of the Justices overruled Adkins
and its iconic treatment of liberty of contract, but this same quintete l employed a much more deferential and pragmatic analysis of
the Commerce Clause in upholding the application of the National
Labor Relations Act to interstate businesses than had theretofore
been the norm. Seen as a whole, the five Labor Board cases
handed down on April 12, 1937,2' together with two other deci-

199W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 391-92, 398-400. "The legislature was entitled to
adopt measures to reduce the evils of the 'sweating system,' the exploiting of workers
at wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living." Id. at 398-99.

White, supra note 1, at 215.

The members of this emerging majority in political economy cases were Chief
Justice Hughes and Associate Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, Roberts, and Stone. In
dissent in most of these cases were Associate Justices Butler,. McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter.
Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937) (upholding
2Wash.,
application of the NLRA to an interstate transportation company); Associated Press
201

v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (sustaining the application of the NLRA to the
editorial department of a private news agency); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (upholding application of the NLRA to the clothing

manufacturing industry); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937)
(upholding application of the NLRA to the trailer manufacturing industry); NLRB v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (sustaining the application of the
NLRA to the production of steel). These cases limited the application of Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04, 308 (1936) (invoking the traditional distinction
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sions sustaining provisions of the Social Security Act 3 and the
Washington minimum wage case suggest, at the very least, that
1937 was a trifle more significant than White otherwise indicates.
However, White's deliberate de-emphasis of 1937 is understandable, and even plausible, given the scope of his thesis and
observation that the Court did not completely abandon the jurisprudential tenets of guardian review in the area of political
economy until the early 1940s. In support of this point, White's
most compelling evidence is Wickard v. Filburn5 in which the
Court, under the influence of Justice Robert Jackson, openly refused to question legislative findings about the aggregate effects of
excessive production of wheat by individual farmers on interstate
commerce" and consequently upheld a federal law that imposed
limits on the amount of wheat grown by private farmers for their
personal, non-commercial use.' In comparison to the Labor Board
cases of 1937 or even to United States v. Darby, the Court's deference toward the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce was astonishing and therefore represented an inferential
leap from previous Commerce Clause cases.' Yet one wonders
whether Justice Jackson would have been so bold if Chief Justice
Hughes, for example, had not asserted in 1937 the importance of
adjudicating constitutional issues of interstate commerce from a
practical perspective that focused on the effects of local activities
upon the flow of interstate commerce210 rather than formal distincbetween manufacturing and commerce and finding that labor relations had an indirect
and remote effect upon interstate commerce).
a' See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937) (both sustaining the Social Security Act of 1935). But see R.R. Ret.
Bd. v. Alton, 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating a retirement pension for railroad
workers).
2 W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 379 (1937).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2

6 Id. at 128-29.
1w Id. at 120-29.
-312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act

to the wages and hours of employees engaged in the manufacturing activities of an
interstate business). This case overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251 (1918),
which had ruled that, as a matter of constitutional law, manufacturing preceded
commerce. See id. at 272-73.
70 Cushman, supra note 21, at 208-25; White, supra note 1, at 227-33.
210See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1937)
("[I]nterstate commerce itself is a practical conception...."); see also Olken, supra
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tions between manufacturing and commerce21 and questions of
causation prevalent in Commerce Clause cases before 1937.212
This is not to say that White is wrong in not placing more emphasis upon 1937 as a pivotal year in the Supreme Court's
constitutional transformation. In fact, because he concentrates
upon the intellectual and historical dimensions of this jurisprudential transition, relatively minor doctrinal points are less important
than the arc of change he so artfully describes. To the extent that a
complete change occurred in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, a revolution occurred, and thus it makes more sense for
White to focus upon the arc of change than on a particular year.
Nevertheless, increased attention to some of the other decisions
from 1937 as well as to the line of state taxation cases previously
mentioned would enhance his general observations about the
structure of this revolution in constitutional interpretation.
C. IntellectualContext andJudicialInfluence
Notwithstanding the considerable attention White places on the
intellectual context in which early twentieth-century constitutional
interpretation evolved, he does not really discuss how some members of the Court came to adopt the "living Constitution" theory
that proved instrumental in the Court's constitutional transformation. This is somewhat curious given his fascinating analysis of
conventional misconceptions about early twentieth-century judicial
behavior and the deification and demonization of certain Supreme
Court Justices from this period.
More in-depth treatment of Chief Justice Hughes, for example,
would provide an essential perspective from which to understand
his efforts at modifying guardian review in the leading political
economy cases of the 1930s. Brief discussion of Chief Justice
Hughes's judicial pragmatism and his respect for stare decisis
would support White's conclusions about West Coast Hotel and 'ennote 129, at 96-100 (discussing the Court's evolving Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
211 See, e.g., Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272-73, overruled by Darby,312 U.S. at 116-17.
212See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936). "The distinction
between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the
cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been brought
about." Id. at 308.
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rich his analysis of Blaisdell. Nor does White mention that the
Chief Justice, along with Justices Stone and Cardozo, was a founding member of the American Law Institute,213 the organization that
sponsored the initial effort to restate common law principles. This
seems a little puzzling given White's point that a transformation in
constitutional jurisprudence occurred within the larger context of
debates about the nature of legal sources and the legitimacy of judicial review that formed the backdrop of the American Law
Institute's Restatement of Law projects and their reception in the
legal community.
In particular, White's analysis of the emergence of the "living
Constitution" theory in the jurisprudential framework of the Court
would benefit from more discussion about the roles played by Justices Cardozo and Stone in this interpretive transformation. Justice
Cardozo, for example, was instrumental in the Court's state taxation cases of the 1930s, consistently articulating a standard of
reasonableness that a majority of the Court would eventually adopt
in its approach toward other aspects of economic regulation." A
consistent and especially articulate proponent of the "living Constitution" theory, it was Justice Cardozo who ultimately supplied
Chief Justice Hughes with the phrase "a growing recognition of
public needs" that Chief Justice Hughes used to considerable effect
in both the Blaisdell and West Coast Hotel majority opinions. 15 In
particular, the Chief Justice borrowed heavily from Justice Cardozo's unpublished concurring opinion in Blaisdell, in which
Justice Cardozo implored the Court to interpret the meaning of the
2

Cushman, supra note 21, at 154.
See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 566-77 (1935) (Cardozo,
J., dissenting) (admonishing the Court for unduly restricting the discretion of the
Kentucky legislature in devising a progressive tax); Fox v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J.,
294 U.S. 87, 97-102 (1935) (Cardozo, J.) (sustaining a West Virginia graduated tax on
gas station chains because it "has a rational relation to the subject matter"); id. at 101
(expressing deference toward local economic regulation); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S.
517,580-86
(1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (same).
"5 Olken, supra note 168, at 590. Compare Chief Justice Hughes's observation in
Blaisdell about "a growing recognition of public needs," Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443-44,
with this passage from Justice Cardozo's draft concurring opinion in that same case:
"[Tihere has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of
finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and the public
welfare." Benjamin Cardozo, Unpublished Draft of Blaisdell Concurring Opinion,
No. 370, at 1 (1933) [hereinafter Cardozo, Blaisdell Draft Concurrence].
D
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Contract Clause in a flexible manner in light of changing economic
conditions. 2'6 This and other aspects of Justice Cardozo's significant
217
contributions to the Court's shifting constitutional jurisprudence,
however, remain far in the background in White's narrative, even
though they would bolster his premise about the manner in which
the Supreme Court handled the crisis of constitutional adaptivity
during the 1930s.
Another important Justice relegated, for the most part, into the
background of White's reconstructed tale is Justice Harlan F.
Stone who, like Justices Cardozo and Brandeis, played an integral
role in the Court's evolving constitutional jurisprudence of political
economy.218 A former Dean of Columbia Law School, Justice Stone
maintained close intellectual ties with Columbia historian Charles
Allen Beard, upon whose historical insight Justice Stone relied in
formulating his analysis of debtor relief legislation and economic
regulation.219 Though not himself a legal realist, Justice Stone cor-

See Olken, supra note 168, at 590. Compare Blaisdell,290 U.S. at 442 (discussing
the need for governmental intervention to preserve private economic rights), with this
passage from Justice Cardozo's unpublished concurring opinion: "[T]he question is no
longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of
reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all
depends." Cardozo, Blaisdell Draft Concurrence, supra note 215, at 1. Chief Justice
Hughes borrowed much of Justice Cardozo's "living Constitution" language as well.
See id. at 1-4.
217 See Cardozo, GrosjeanDraft Concurrence, supra note 130.
218See Olken, supra note 168, at 578, 584-85, 590-91 (discussing contributions of
Justice Stone to the Chief Justice's majority opinion); Memorandum from Justice
Harlan F. Stone to Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes 3 (Dec. 13, 1933) (available in
the Stone Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Memorandum from Stone
to Hughes]; Notes of Harlan F. Stone on Blaisdell (1933) (available in the Stone
Papers at the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Notes of Justice Stone].
219Justice Stone imbued his analysis of the Minnesota mortgage moratorium case
with "living Constitution" theory as seen below in an excerpt from his personal notes
about the case:
The framers of the Constitution undoubtedly had legislation of this type in
mind. But the framers represented a class, and the Constitution itself was
submitted only to conventions which were chosen by an electorate limited by
heavy property qualifications. Our ideas of interests worthy of protection, and
of the voice in government which various interests are to have, have undergone
much change since 1789. It would be reducing the Constitution to the state of a
penal law or an ordinary statute to hold that the intent of a handful of
aristocrats in 1789 should be binding upon the society found in Minnesota
today.
216
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responded with some of the leading theorists whose ideas about.
the nature of legal authority probably influenced his conception of
judicial review.'2 Together with Justices Brandeis and Cardozo he
formed a solid bloc on the Court whose notions of constitutional
adaptivity eventually prevailed. Perhaps the most cogent evidence
of Justice Stone's influence is the extensive memorandum and draft
concurring opinion that he submitted to Chief Justice Hughes during the Court's deliberations in Blaisdell.Justice Stone explained at
length the economic context of the Minnesota mortgage moratorium and urged the Chief Justice to recognize the state's legitimate
authority to exercise its police powers to preserve economic opportunity." Moreover, as Hughes's successor as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, he presided over the final stages of the Court's
constitutional transformation.
Yet, aside from some in-depth analysis of Justice Stone's famous
footnote in CaroleneProducts,White appears to neglect his contribution to the Court's interpretative transformation. Upon his
unexpected death in 1946, Stone left a comprehensive record of his
two decades on the Court in the boxes of papers he was not able to
edit before he died. The papers that form his collection provide invaluable insight and information about Supreme Court
adjudication to any student of early twentieth-century constituMemorandum from Stone to Hughes, supra note 218, at 4. For evidence of Justice
Stone's consultation with Beard about some matters of constitutional history, see
Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 410-11, 553 (1956);
see also Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States 73-151 (Free Press 1986) (1913) (arguing the constitutional framers
were part of an economic elite).
2"OJustie Stone, for example, corresponded with Columbia law professor Herman
Oliphant, whose intense interest in the study of law as a science prompted him to
undertake the initial, but ultimately unsuccessful, plan to create a law school at The
John Hopkins University in Baltimore whose principal objective would have been to
function as a legal research center. Correspondence between Oliphant and Justice
Stone about this matter can be found in the Stone Papers at the Library of Congress.
For brief references to the relationship between Oliphant and Stone, see Mason,
supra note 219, at 128, 218, 240.
2 Memorandum from Stone to Hughes, supra note 218, at 2-4; Notes of Justice
Stone, supra note 218; Memorandum of Gertrude Jenkins, Secretary to Justice Stone,
regarding Blaisdell (1933) (available in the Stone Papers at the Library of Congress)
(indicating that Justice Stone thought Blaisdellwas quite similar to the Rent Cases in
that the mortgage moratorium exemplified the reasonable exercise of police powers
during an economic emergency); see also Olken, supra note 168, at 584-85, 590-91
(discussing Justice Stone and Blaisdell).
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tional history. Given the breadth of his intellectual interests and
the diversity of his correspondents, there is much raw material in
Justice Stone's papers from which one could reconstruct the extent
to which he and perhaps some other members of the Hughes Court
were influenced by modernity. Increased attention to Justice
Stone, as well as to Justice Cardozo, might, therefore, fill in some
of the details of White's account and enrich its perspective.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the best standard to use in reviewing this book is one
previously articulated by its author. In an essay published several
years ago, G. Edward White observed:
Revisionism is an art because the choice of a given methodological approach to the raw materials of history cannot insure
the success or failure of an interpretive structure. Whether a
given interpretation is rich or flat, seminal or conventional, coherent or tortured; whether it presses the limits of, or sets new
limits for, intellectual discourses or whether it remains squarely,
and prosaically, in the center of established orthodoxy; and finally, whether it inspires or bores other scholars-these are
questions that cannot be solved methodologically. The "revisionist" historian, like the artist, may well be fated, in most
cases, to choose the materials of his day; he may even research
and write, as many artists can be said to paint, within the confines of a "school" of thought. But the impact of his scholarship
will depend not only on the questions that his angle of vision
suggests are appropriate to ask but how imaginatively and suggestively he answers them.'
Though volumes have been written about the Supreme Court
and the New Deal, few combine the intellectual rigor and creative
synthesis that distinguish White's fascinating study of early twentieth-century constitutional history. This is a book whose influence
will endure and inspire future generations of constitutional historians.

- G. Edward White, Intervention and Detachment, supra note 24, at 68-69.

